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INTRODUCTION
On July i, 1963, the International Coffee Agreement, 1962 entered provisionally
into force among thirty-seven countries, thereby successfully culminating years of
effort to establish a global system regulating commerce in one of the world's most
important and troublesome commodities.
Briefly, the five-year Agreement, which replaces a more limited short-term Agree-
ment, is desigiied to stabilize the price of coffee and to bring about long-term
equilibrium between coffee production and consumption. Its most important feature
is a comprehensive system of export quotas which will limit supplies put on the
market by exporting Members to estimated levels of demand. In order to police
these quotas, all coffee shipments by Members must be accompanied by certificates
showing the coffee's origin. Importing Members will prohibit imports of coffee
from other Members without such certificates, and will, in certain circumstances,
impose limitations on imports of coffee from non-Members. The Members also
agree to study and to undertake measures to progressively reduce overproduction
and stocks and to increase coffee consumption. To administer the Agreement, a new
international institution-the International Coffee Organization-is established and
given broad powers.
Despite the Agreement's prosaic tide and technical character, it deserves study
for several reasons.
First, the Coffee Agreement is one of the most significant international economic
agreements negotiated in recent years. Its provisions will affect more than one and
three-quarter billion dollars in world trade and its membership may eventually
include more than seventy countries-two-thirds of the nations of the world. It will
have a vital and immediate impact on the lives of almost twenty million people
in over thirty countries, and an indirect effect on hundreds of millions more.
And because of the great dependence of many countries in Latin America and
Africa on coffee exports, the success or failure of the Agreement may profoundly
influence the political and economic future of two continents.
Second, the Coffee Agreement is the latest and most far-reaching of a growing
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and increasingly important series of such commodity arrangements.' Similar agree-
ments are presently in force covering wheat, sugar, tin, and olive oil,2 and an agree-
ment on cocoa may be reached in the very near future. Increased international
concern for the special problems of primary commodities and of the underdeveloped
countries which produce them3 have led to proposals for other agreements covering
'This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems constitutes the most comprehensive recent survey
of international commodity agreements. A brief general introduction to the subject is contained in
LAWRENCE W. TOWLE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY ch. 28 (with suggested readings)
(2d ed. 1956). For other recent discussions, see "X," Three International Commodity Agreements, 35
BrrT. Ya. Isrr'L L. 240 (i96o); INTERNATIONAL NATIONAL CoNsuLTANTs, INC., CommoDiorr PROBLEMS
IN LATIN AMRIuCA ch. 4 ("International Commodity Agreements") (1959)-Study No. 2 of Compilation
of Studies on United States-Latin American Relations, prepared under the direction of the Subcommittee
on American Republic Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Doc. No. 125, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 159 (196o); Coffee Study Group, Historical Review of Efforts to Stabilize the Coffee Market
and of International Agreements-Proposals for a Long-Term Agreement (ist rev. Feb. 15, i961), pp.
49-81, which is Part VI of the iu-part Coffee Study Group's study, THE WORLD CoFFER PROBLEM: PREsENT
STATus OP TE INDusTRY AND FuTuRE PRosPEcrs (196o-62); and LEON BARANYAI, HIsToRY oF Com-
MODITY AOREnmENTs (INTrERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMLENT REP. No. EC-74a)
(1959).
'Primary commodity agreements other than the International Coffee Agreement, x962, currently
in force are: the International Wheat Agreement, x962, T.I.A.S. No. 5115; the International Sugar
Agreement of x958, T.I.A.S. No. 4389; the Second International Agreement, ig6o, CMND. No. x759,
(U.K.T.S. No. 45 of 1962); and the International Olive Oil Agreement, x956, as amended by the Protocol
of April 3, 1958, 336 U.N.T.S. 177. The short-term International Coffee Agreement, discussed in the text
infra at 335-39, first entered into force October x959; and was extended by its Board of Directors for addi-
tional one-year periods by Res. No. ii of June ii, 196o; Res. No. 26 of September 27, x961; and Res. No.
39 of October 4, x962. It terminated upon the entry into force of the long-term International Coffee
Agreement, 1962, on July 1, 1963. The text has not been published in any standard compilation.
The quota provisions of the Sugar Agreement were only effective for the first three years of its five year
term, and since they failed of renegotiation and lapsed in i96i, that agreement is not as a practical matter
presently operative. The Olive Oil Agreement will be renegotiated this summer. The United States
is party to the Wheat, Sugar, and Coffee Agreements.
International Commodity Study Groups have been established covering almost a dozen commodities,
including lead and zinc, citrus fruits, rubber, wool, grains, cotton, and cocoa. For a discussion of the
work of such groups, see Nichols, The International Lead and Zinc Study Group, 42 DEP'T STATE BULL.
758 (196o); Mellen, International Consultations on Rubber, 44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 78 (1961).
The Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement, which recently entered into force, has certain features in
common with primary commodity agreements, but is concerned with manufactured rather than primary
commodities and problems of market disruption from low-cost imports rather than general market insta-
bility and price decline. For text, see 46 DEs'T STATE BuLL. (i962). The Narcotics Convention (T.S. 6x2,
T.S. 863, T.I.A.S. No. 1671, and T.I.A.S. No. 2308) and the Treaty constituting the European Coal and
Steel Community (261 U.N.T.S. 140) are also concerned with problems of particular commodities.
As is explained at length in other articles in this issue, primary commodity agreements are basically
of three types: (i) export quota agreements, such as the Sugar and Coffee Agreements, which support
prices by limiting the exports of each member; (2) multilateral contract agreements, such as the Wheat
Agreement, in which prices are supported within an agreed range through an undertaking by exporters to
sell given amounts to importers at not more than a specified ceiling price, and an undertaking by importers
to buy given amounts from exporters at not less than a specified floor price; and (3) buffer stock agree-
ments, such as the Tin Agreement, in which prices are supported within an agreed range through the
operations of an international buffer stock organization which enters the market to buy or sell the com-
modity at specified floor and celing prices. Each type has its particular virtues and defects, and, in
practice, particular agreements may combine features drawn from several of these types.
' Among the many recent discussions of the nature and international significance of the special
problems of primary producing countries, see, e.g., the International Economic Consultants, Inc., study
cited supra note i; Butler, Trade and the Less Developed Areas, 41 FoREioG AFFARs 372 (1963); and
Commodities in Search of Stability, The Economist, Jan. 12, 1963, p. 130.
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bananas, tea, and lead and zinc. Moreover, serious consideration is being given to the
possible use of such agreements as a means of handling the troublesome problems
of agricultural trade relations between the Common Market and other agricultural-
producing countries. Commodity agreements are thus likely to play an increasingly
important role in the world economy, and the Coffee Agreement may well form a
principal model in future commodity negotiations.
Third, international economic agreements in general, and commodity agreements
in particular, have been sadly neglected by international lawyers, despite the fact
that arrangements of this type cumulatively embody important experience in the
area of international cooperation and regulation, and are in some cases unique experi-
ments in developing techniques of international legal control.4 Thus, in entering
into economic agreements (in contrast with political agreements), countries have
frequently been willing to make some concessions as regards strict concepts of national
sovereignty; for example, by consenting to the use of weighted voting to reflect
differences in national stakes in the matter, and to continuous and detailed interna-
tional intervention by an international organization into matters of hitherto solely
national competence. A comprehensive study and analysis of this experience is long
overdue.
Finally, the story of the negotiation of the Coffee Agreement may be of more
general interest as illustrating the particular international mechanisms and procedures
which are involved in bringing such an arrangement into being, and the practical
problems, conflicting interests, and opposing tensions which shape its form and sub-
stance. The history of the Agreement may thus serve to give a more realistic sense
of how an international agreement actually comes about.
This article will emphasize this last aspect in an attempt to show the development
of the Coffee Agreement as an example of the complex and many-faceted process of
international problem-solving. The text of the Agreement is summarized and
commented on in an Appendix.
I
TiE CoFFE PROBLEM
The International Coffee Agreement of 1962 evolved out of international efforts
to solve the problem of chronic price instability and persistent overproduction and
price decline in the international coffee market. Because of the importance of
coffee in world trade and the great significance of coffee exports to the economic
and political stability of the producing countries, this problem assumed a particular
urgency.
In order to better understand the nature of the Agreement and the various forces
that forged it, it is necessary to have some grasp of the technical and economic
'For a survey of some of these economic agreements, and a discussion of their general features, see
Hexner, Worldaide International Economic Institutions: A Factual Survey, 61 CoLum. L. Rnv. 354
(I96i).
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characteristics of coffee itself, and, more generally, of the workings of the inter-
national coffee economy.5 The facts given below were the parameters within which
the negotiation of the Agreement proceeded and its substance was formed.
Coffee is a tree crop, the beans consisting of the cherry-like fruit of the tree, which
is typically roasted and ground or processed into soluble form before sale to the
consumer. It is grown commercially only in tropical regions. Consumer preferences
and thus price may markedly differ as between the three major commercial varieties:
(i) Brazils, grown only in Brazil; (2) milds, produced mainly in the rest of Latin
America; and (3) robustas, which come principally from Central Africa.
A central factor in the inflexibility of the coffee problem is the long gestation
period (ie., the period from planting to bearing) and the long producing life of the
coffee tree. A tree will take from three to five years to begin bearing, but will
then bear productively for twenty-five to forty years. The principal costs of cultiva-
tion to the grower arise from the cost of purchasing and clearing land and planting
trees, rather than in harvesting, and a crop will generally be harvested regardless
of market price. The practical result of the combination of these technical and
economic factors is to make coffee production relatively "inelastic" to short-run
changes in price. That is, coffee marketings do not readily expand or contract over
short periods even when prices vary dramatically.
Coffee ranks first among agricultural commodities in terms of importance in
world trade, and is second only to petroleum among all primary commodities, with
exports valued in excess of one and three-quarter billion dollars a year. Its great
importance in international trade derives principally from the fact that most of the
world's coffee is consumed in countries which do not produce it-that is, to which
it must be exported. Commodities such as wheat, rice, sugar, oils and fats, and
livestock are of greater over-all economic importance than coffee, but since most
countries produce at least part of their own requirements of these products, import
needs are less. Coffee is also a very important item in United States imports, amount-
ing in 1961 to about six and one-half per cent of U.S. total imports. In earlier years,
due to higher coffee prices, this percentage was considerably greater.
Over thirty countries grow coffee as a major crop. In the coffee year 1962 (which
by trade custom runs from October 1961 to September i962) production amounted
to about 71 million bags (each bag weighing 6o kilograms or about 132 pounds).
The principal areas of cultivation are in Latin America, in which fifteen of the
twenty countries of that region grow coffee, and Central Africa, with Latin Ameri-
can production greatly predominant. The most important producers are Brazil,
which is responsible for about half the world's production, and Colombia, which
'Recent comprehensive studies of the coffee problem include the Coffee Study Group's io-volume
survey, THn WoRLD COFFEE PROBLEM: PRESENT STATUS OF THE INDUSrY AND FUTuRE PROSPECTS (196o-
62); and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization's study, THE WoRxD COFFE ECONOMY (FAO
CoMDIrTY BULLETIN SER. No. 33, g6x). See also VERNON D. WICKIZER, THE WoR.LD COFFEE ECONOMY
(I943); and VERNON D. WIC.IZER, CO'FEE, TEA AND COCOA Pt. I (Coffee) (1951). Most of the facts and
statistics in this and the next section are drawn from these sources.
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produces about eleven per cent. The next most important producers-El Salvador,
Guatemala, Mexico, Portugese Angola, and the Ivory Coast-are each responsible
for only five per cent or less of world production.
Almost every country of the world imports some coffee. In 1962 total world
exports amounted to about 45.3 million bags. By far the largest consumer is the
United States, which accounts for half of world imports. Europe collectively
accounts for another two-fifths of world imports, with Germany, France, and Italy
in that order most important. Comparatively little coffee is consumed in Eastern
Europe, Africa, the Near East, or Asia.
Artificial trade barriers in the form of tariffs, quotas, and internal taxes have an
important influence on patterns of coffee trade and consumption. While the United
States imposes almost no restrictions of these types on coffee,7 significant barriers
in the form of high import duties, quantitative restrictions, and internal taxes exist
in the countries of the European Economic Community (the Common Market)."
Of particular importance is the fact that under the Rome Treaty the newly in-
dependent African countries of the franc zone will have a special associated status.
As the common external tariff progressively takes effect, coffee imports from these
countries will have increasingly favored treatment as compared with coffee imports
from Latin America,9 potentially resulting in a very substantial decline in Latin
American exports to Europe. As will be seen, the Latin American demand for
the removal of these restrictions was a principal issue in the negotiation of the
Agreement.
The enormous significance of coffee to the economic and political life of the
countries which produce it can hardly be exaggerated. Almost all of the producing
countries are underdeveloped, single-crop economies, which rely heavily upon coffee
"More detailed figures of production and exports for the coffee year 196i-62 are (in millions of bags
of 6o kilograms or about 132 pounds each):
World Brazil Colombia
Total Production 71 35 (49%) 7.8 (1%)
Exportable Production 58 28 (48%) 6.8 (12%)
Exports 45.3 x6.a (36%) 6.5 (x4%)
"Coffee is on the United States tariff Free List (71 Stat. 516 (1957), 72 Star. 602, 19 U.S.C. S 1201,
para. 1654 (1958)). However, coffee substitutes and adulterants, and coffee essences are presently subject
to a tariff of 3 0/lb. (72 Stat. 88, 19 U.S.C. § oor, para. 776 (1958)), although legislation now pending
before Congress (H.R. 4198, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (1962)) would amend the Tariff Act to place soluble
and instant coffee on the Free List. For special provisions concerning coffee imported into Puerto Rico, see
46 Stat. 696 (930), as amended, 47 Stat. 158 (1932), 19 U.S.C. § 1319 (1958); 48 Stat. 1017 (1934) as
amended, 49 Stat. 665 (i935), 19 U.S.C. § 1319a (i958).
' Total burdens on coffee (import duties and internal taxes) within the Common Market countries
have been estimated to amount in some cases to as much as 200% of import value. See Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations on International Coflee Agreement, r962, Executive H, 87 th
Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (x963) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. In addition, coffee imports into France, for
instance, are subject to quantitative restrictions favoring imports from franc-zone African countries, which
receive in this protected market prices considerably higher than world prices.
' Under an agreement of association between the European Economic Community and the franc-zone
African nations, coffee tariffs will gradually diminish and ultimately be inapplicable to these countries.
This will give these countries substantially preferential treatment as compared with other coffee producers
who will eventually pay a common external tariff of 9.6% (to which figure the originally planned CXT
of z6% has been reduced under the terms of a recent agreement).
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exports for the foreign exchange they need to pay for imports for current con-
sumption and particularly for economic development. Thus, more than twelve
countries depend upon coffee exports for from thirty to eighty per cent of their
foreign exchange earnings, and close to half of Brazilian and more than two-thirds
of Colombian foreign exchange comes from coffee 1 Among Latin American pro-
ducers generally, almost a quarter of their total export earnings are derived from
this single product, and a one cent decline in coffee prices means a foreign-exchange
loss to Latin America of about 45 million dollars a year. Moreover, in some of these
countries, taxes derived from coffee production account for as much as twenty per
cent of total Government revenues. Coffee is thus of central importance to the exist-
ence of many of these nations, and the repercussions of economic difficulties in the
international coffee economy may profoundly affect every facet of their people's lives.
Coffee is in fact subject to several persistent and thus far intractable economic
problems: (i) a problem of short-run market instability; and (2) a problem of long-
run overproduction in terms of what the market will absorb at remunerative prices.
In effect, because of certain inherent technical and economic characteristics of coffee,
the free-market mechanism has been unable to adequately perform its traditional
function of bringing supply and demand into equilibrium at reasonable prices for
both producers and consumers.
The short-run problem of recurring market instability, as evidenced by sharp
fluctuations in coffee prices, results essentially from so-called short-run "inelasticities"
of supply and demand of coffee-the inability of supply and demand to respond
quickly to price changes occurring over short periods. Thus, on the supply side,
when circumstances such as the Korean conflict bring rapid upward movements in :
demand and price, rapid adjustment of production to meet this demand is precluded
by the fact that coffee trees cannot be brought into production for a period of several
years. Conversely, if demand and price fall because of such factors as an economic
recession in a principal consuming country, producers cannot quickly reduce
production. Similarly, on the demand side, consumption of coffee is relatively stable,
expanding or contracting only gradually in response to sharp changes in supply and
price brought about by short-run factors such as variations in crops due to changes
in weather.
In addition to these difficulties, coffee producers are also subject to a so-called
o in the Hearings on the Agreement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supra note 8, at
76, the State Department submitted the following list of percentages of certain countries' total export
earnings attributable to coffee (based on 1961 statistics except as otherwise noted):
Colombia 7, Togo (1959) 41
Guatemala 6o Angola (ig6o) 35
El Salvador 59 Uganda 34
Ethiopia 5, Kenya 31
Brazil 51 Nicaragua 27
Costa Rica 49 Cameroun 21
Ivory Coast 46 Malagasy 20
Haiti 41
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"seasonal marketing problems," resulting from the fact that a substantial part of world
production is harvested at about the same time of the year (summer and early fall).
Since a number of Latin American producers, particularly in Central America, do
not have the storage facilities or financial resources to hold such crops for orderly
distribution throughout the year, a great deal of this coffee tends to flood the market
at the same time, resulting in sharp price drops, with price increases in non-harvest
seasons. As a result of these various factors, coffee prices often vary greatly within
and between years.
The long-run coffee problem is simply that coffee cultivation has consistently
tended to outpace the normal growth of world consumption. The comparative ease
of coffee cultivation, the many areas of the world suited to its production, and the
high yields and returns possible for the successful grower per unit of area cultivated
as compared with other tropical crops, have led to a rapid and continuing expansion
of productive capacity-at first in Brazil, then throughout Latin America, and most
recently in central Africa. On the other hand, consumption has grown quite slowly
(about three to three and one-half per cent per annum), principally as a function of
normal population growth and the gradual development of new markets.
Despite this disequilibrium, the traditional producers of Latin America have
generally failed to adequately respond to these changed conditions-as, for instance,
by cutting back production or attempting to shift resources into more economic uses.
Instead, they have in some cases adopted national support policies (such as production
and export subsidies and preferential tax treatment for coffee production) which tend
to maintain or increase production, and which, in some countries, particularly in
Brazil and Colombia, have resulted in the accumulation of enormous stocks, which
further overhang the market and depress prices.
The situation in the period since World War II illustrates this pattern. Strong
demand during the immediate post-war period, coupled with successive frosts in
Brazil in the period 1948 to 1953, brought about sharply rising prices, which in turn
resulted in a great increase in plantings, particularly in Central Africa. By the early
i95o's, these new plantings had begun to come into production, and by 1955 world
exportable production had overtaken demand. Since that time, the situation of over-
production has worsened and prices have pursued an almost relentless decline.
Between 1954 and 1962, the average wholesale price of a pound of coffee fell from
about 79 cents to less than 35 cents, or by more than fifty per cent. Present estimates
of exportable production during the coffee year 1962-63 amount to about 53 million
bags, whereas estimates of imports for consumption amount to only some 46 million
bags; that is, only about eighty-six per cent of the 1962-63 crop can hope to find
buyers. By 1962, world stocks in the amount of some 66 million bags had accumu-
lated-enough to supply the world's needs for some 8 months; Brazil alone now
holds stocks sufficient to supply the world for over a year.
Moreover, Latin American producers have been subject to two special difficulties
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in this period. First, prices of Latin American imports have risen relative to the
prices of that region's exports, resulting in a shift of the "terms of trade" against it.
Second, African producers have cut increasingly into Latin America's traditional
share of the world market, aided by substantially lower prices, the increasing
acceptability to consumers of robusta type coffees in blends, preferential arrangements
with the Common Market countries, and the suitability of the robusta coffees in
the growing field of soluble coffees.
By 1962, every indication was that, in the absence of some solution such as
that hoped for in the Coffee Agreement, the situation would get worse rather than
better.
PREvious ATTEMPTS AT REGULATION
The growth of international cooperation with respect to coffee is fairly typical
of such developments in other areas in the international economic field. At first, each
country attempts to deal with the problem on its own. However, since no one
country is ordinarily in a position either to control the international market or to
effectively insulate itself from it, these unilateral measures have only an indifferent
degree of success, and there is a slowly growing realization that the problem cannot
be successfully dealt with in this way. A considerable period may follow in which
the countries concerned slowly grope towards bilateral and then multilateral
solutions. The problem is discussed in various international meetings, study groups
are formed, and tentative and often unsuccessful first experiments at international
agreement are made. During this incubation period, problems are gradually defined,
possibilities grasped, experience accumulated, and policies crystallized. Also, the
principal government and industry officials concerned get to know their counterparts
in other countries and to understand each other's views. Finally, the climate
of international opinion in the field may at last be prepared for substantial innova-
tion, and the stage set for an attempt at effective agreement.
In the case of coffee, the chronic difficulties of the world coffee situation have
been under discussion for some sixty years.' In the years prior to World War II,
attempts to regulate the market were primarily made by Brazil alone, which at that
time produced most of the world's coffee. Thus, for many years Brazil, under a
series of so-called "valorization" plans, sought to stabilize the world coffee market
by limiting its own exports and, where necessary, buying and accumulating stocks.
Between x93i and 1944, it destroyed some 78 million bags of coffee-more than a
year's current world consumption-in an attempt to maintain prices. However, as
coffee cultivation in other areas developed (partly as a result of the market situation
brought about by Brazilian stabilization efforts), and Brazil's share in the world
" See generally, on the background of attempts at international coffee stabilization, Part VI of the
Coffee Study Group's study, op. cit. supra note i, at 17-48; VERNON D. WIC-IZER, THE WoRLa COFFEE
EcoNoMY ch. xo (943), and VERNON D. WicrizER, COFFEE, TEA AND CocoA 26 et seq. (195i).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
market- became somewhat less dominant, it became apparent that such unilateral
efforts were becoming increasingly expensive and ineffective.
The first experience in international coffee regulation occurred in 1940, when the
United States and fourteen Latin American countries entered into the Inter-
American Coffee Agreement.'2 The Agreement established a quota system pro-
viding for a division of the United States market among Latin American producers
and required the United States to limit imports from non-Member countries. How-
ever, the Agreement was primarily intended to deal with the particular wartime
problem created for Latin American producers by the closing of European markets
and to strengthen United States relations with that area during this period of crisis,
rather than being designed to solve basic coffee problems. It lapsed soon after the
end of the war. Nevertheless, the Agreement succeeded in substantially increasing
coffee prices during the time it was in effect.
With the post-war boom in coffee demand and prices, belief in the need for
international measures diminished. By 1954, however, the coffee problem had
again become disturbing, and interest in some form of international action resumed.
Thus, the 1954 meeting of the American Ministers of Finance and Economy, acting
as the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American
States, called upon that Council's Special Committee on Coffee to study the world
coffee situation, and, if it seemed feasible, to propose cooperative measures that could
limit fluctuations in coffee prices and maintain them within levels satisfactory to
producers and consumers. The OAS Secretariat prepared a series of detailed studies
for the Special Committee, including two proposals for an international agreement.
However, by 1954, the price situation had not yet deteriorated to the point where
most producers were vitally concerned. Moreover, it was generally considered at
that time that an effective agreement could not be negotiated within the framework
of the OAS alone, since participation of the African producers and the European
consumers was believed to be an essential ingredient of any scheme's success. Also,
the United States at that time found the prospect of an international agreement on
coffee both difficult to accept in principle and questionable from the standpoint of
feasibility. The OAS proposals were therefore not pursued.
In 1955 and 1956, pressures for international action again mounted as production
expanded and prices fell even more. The huge coffee crop of 1957-58, and the in-
creasing conviction of the existence of a condition of chronic overproduction, brought
the situation to a head. In an attempt to secure at least temporary relief from the
strong downward drift of prices resulting from the heavy surplus, seven Latin
American producers-Brazil, Colombia, Cost Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico,
2 The Agreement was signed in Washington on November 28, X940 and became effective April 16,
1941. The quota arrangements were terminated in 1945 and the Agreement expired in September 1948.
For a discussion of its background, see Daniels, The Inter-American Coflee Agreement, 8 LAw & CoNTraM.
PROB. 7o8 (1941). Legislation implementing the Agreement (the Act of April 11, 1941, 55 Stat. 133) is
curiously enough still included in the U.S. Code (19 U.S.C. §§ 1355 and 1356 (1958)).
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and Nicaragua-met together in Mexico City in October 1957 and concluded an
emergency short-term Mexico City Agreement based on an allocation of quarterly
export quotas to each participating country. However, the Mexico City Agreement
failed to curb exports effectively and, though the decline in coffee prices was
temporarily mitigated, the process of erosion continued.
Meanwhile, the United States, which for a variety of reasons was becoming in-
creasingly aware of and involved in the problems of the developing countries of
Latin America and Africa, began to take a serious interest in the coffee problem.
In x958, on the initiative of the United States, a Coffee Study Group comprised of
over twenty producing and consuming countries was formed, with headquarters in
Washington, D.C.
Initial meetings of the Coffee Study Group resulted in the recognition that there
were essentially two types of problems the Group had to face: (I) the immediate
and emergency problem of rapidly declining prices; and (2) the underlying problem
of long-run disequilibrium. The Group's efforts were therefore directed along
these separate but interrelated lines.
In the summer of 1958, in order to provide an emergency stop-gap measure to
permit time for fuller study of the coffee problem and its possible solution, fifteen
of the Latin American producing countries negotiated and signed the Latin American
Coffee Agreement. This Agreement, which took effect in October i958, was based
upon a system of export quotas whereby each producing country was to retain a
specified percentage of its total exportable production.
Further study by the Coffee Study Group during 1959 resulted in proposals to
replace the Latin American Coffee Agreement by a new and somewhat broader and
more comprehensive short-term agreement. Negotiations in Washington culminated
in the signature of the short-term International Coffee Agreement, which came into
force in October 1959 for a one-year period. The Agreement specified quotas for
each participant based upon its choice of either: (x) ninety per cent of its exports
in its best year 1949 to 1958, or (2) for any country having less than two million
bags of exportable production, eighty-eight per cent of its current estimate of ex-
portable production. The limitation in the alternative was designed to make it
unavailable to Brazil and Colombia. Exports to certain non-traditional markets of
Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia were to be excluded from quota calculations. The
short-term Agreement broke new ground by including, for the first time, non-
Latin American producers; in addition to the fifteen former members of the Latin
American Coffee Agreement, France and Portugal signed the new short-term agree-
ment on behalf of their respective African territories or overseas provinces. How-
ever, importing countries were still not represented.
In September i96o, the short-term agreement was extended for an additional year,
with an increased membership of twenty-eight producing countries representing
about ninety per cent of world exports of coffee. As will be seen, this agreement
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was also subsequently extended in 1961 and 196z in anticipation of the negotiation
and entry into force of the new long-term International Coffee Agreement.
Despite the ambitious nature of the short-term agreement, its broad producer
membership, and some success in arresting the continuing decline in prices, it had
been early realized by the Coffee Study Group that any such limited arrangement
was an inadequate solution to basic coffee problems. First, the total and individual
quotas established by the agreement were set at unrealistically high levels in terms
of estimated world consumption, and hence had little chance of exercising any
meaningful stabilizing effect on declining prices. Second, even these inflated quotas
were being violated by certain of the member countries; these violations were
difficult to police or to control due both to the fact that importing countries were not
members and to the lack of certain agreed definitions, which gave rise to misunder-
standings and disagreements as to just what exports were chargeable to quotas. Third,
the agreement did not attempt to deal with the root cause of the long-run coffee prob-
lem-overproduction-and was thus at best a temporary palliative.
The limited success of the short-term agreement reinforced the conviction of the
principal members of the Coffee Study Group that an effective long-run solution
to the coffee problem could be attained only through a truly global pact including
both exporting and importing countries in its membership, establishing realistic
quotas, and making some sort of attack on the basic problems of overproduction
and underconsumption. This conclusion was reinforced by an exhaustive ten-
volume study of all aspects of the coffee industry undertaken by the Coffee Study
Group and issued in successive volumes during the period December 196o through
April 1962. However, it was equally clear that such an agreement could not hope
for success without the active participation of the world's major importer-the United
States; and United States policy, despite the participation of that country in the
work of the Coffee Study Group, had under the Eisenhower administration been
generally opposed to international commodity agreements (though the United
States had, for special reasons, joined the Sugar and Wheat Agreements). The
possibilities for a new agreement thus hinged on whether the attitude of the United
States would change in this respect.
The answer was given by President Kennedy in his "Alliance for Progress"
speech of March i96x, in which he announced, among other things, that the United
States was ready "to cooperate in a serious case-by-case examination of commodity
market problems."'" The basis for this new United States position was the clearer
The speech was given March 13, ig6i. The relevant excerpt in full is:
"Fifth, the United States is ready to cooperate in serious case-by-case examinations of commodity market
problems. Frequent violent changes in commodity prices seriously injure the economies of many Latin
American nations, draining their resources and stultifying their growth. Together we must find practical
methods of bringing an end to this pattern." 44 DEp'T STATE BULL. 471, 473 (5961).
Though the previous Administration had also expressed its willingness to consider such agreements on
a case-by-case basis, the tone and content of the President's statement, coupled with other pronouncements
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comprehension by the United States Government of the close relation between the
situation of the international coffee market and general problems of economic and
political stability and development in the coffee producing countries, the growing
foreign relations interest of the United States in the effective solution of those
problems, and the obvious connection between the stability of foreign exchange
earnings of such countries and their external aid requirements.
The new commodity policy enunciated by President Kennedy led to a further
intensive study of the coffee problem within the United States Government. In
August 1961, at the Special Meeting of the OAS Inter-American Economic and
Social Council in Punta del Este, Uruguay, the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation,
Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, formally declared that the United States was
"prepared to join a workable coffee agreement, to use its good offices to urge the
participation of other consuming countries, and to help in the enforcement of export
quotas through the use of import controls," and that when the Coffee Study Group
met in September, "the United States would propose that a new agreement be
drafted to achieve these ends."14
The forces were thus marshalled and the stage set for an attempt at a global
solution to the coffee problem.
III
PREPARATORY WORK
With the formal announcement at Punta del Este that the United States was
willing to participate and, more important, to assume leadership in the preparation
and negotiation of a new long-term agreement, events began to move swiftly.15
The first step was the unanimous adoption by the Punta del Este Conference of
three resolutions dealing with different aspects of the coffee problem, one of which
(Resolution C.i) set forth general principles for a long-term coffee agreement for
further implementation by the Coffee Study Group1
In September i96i, the Coffee Study Group, whose membership had by this time
(largely as a result of increasing interest and participation by importing countries)
increased to over thirty-four countries, agreed that a basis existed for a long-term
agreement, and appointed a ten nation Coordinating and Drafting Committee,
by the new Administration, made it clear that a real change of policy was occurring. See United States
Coffee Policy, Coffee Annual 1961, p. 59-
" The statement was given on August 7, z96i. The full text appears in 45 DEP'T STATE BULL.
355, 359-60 (1961).
"5 For a general discussion of some of the preparatory work for the Conference, see Santos, The Long-
Term Agreement, Coffee Annual x961, p. 51, and Wood, Background of the Long-Term Agreement, id.
at 45.
"
8 Resolution C.2 concerned international regulatory measures and seasonal financing. Resolution C.3
appointed a committee to negotiate the elimination of restrictions on coffee consumption (this being
directed primarily at Common Market restrictions). Title IV of the Charter of Punta del Este establishing
the Alliance for Progress deals with the subject of "Basic Export Commodities"; paragraph 6 of chapter
II of that Title specifically endorses commodity agreements as a means of solution of commodity
problems. See 45 DP'T STATE BuLL. 459, 469 (i96i).
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chaired by W. Michael Blumenthal of the United States, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs, to prepare a draft. The Coordinating and Drafting
Committee in turn chose three representatives in a personal and expert capacity to
actually prepare the instrument with the assistance of the Coffee Study Group Secre-
tariat. At the same time, the members of the short-term agreement extended it for an
additional year until October 1962. By December i96i, a first draft of a proposed long-
term agreement had been prepared and distributed to the various members of the
Coffee Study Gioup and to more than fifteen additional countries for comment0'
In March 1962, the Coffee Study Group met to consider this December draft.
The meeting generally agreed that a new long-term agreement should, like previous
agreements, be based primarily on a system of export quotas; that total quotas should
be realistic in terms of world consumption; that importers should be included and
should play a substantial role in policing the quota system; that imports from non-
member producers should be limited; that increased consumption should be actively
promoted; and that meaningful measures to control production and stocks were
essential. On the other hand, the meeting revealed that particular exporting coun-
tries were prepared to argue that, due to special and unique circumstances, they
should not be subject to as onerous and restrictive quotas as other countries; that
there was no substantial agreement on the role of price provisions, if any, in the
proposed agreement, and their relationship to quotas; and that the European
countries were cool to the idea of including in any agreement provisions relating
to the reduction or elimination of coffee taxes, quotas, and preferences. There was
in fact a disturbing general unwillingness of the participants to engage in full
discussion of a number of key issues which a negotiating conference would have to
face.
Nevertheless, the March meeting of the Coffee Study Group concluded that the
December draft was a reasonable basis for negotiation, and that the Group should
formally request the Secretary General of the United Nations to convoke a formal
international conference in June or July of 1962 to negotiate a new long-term agree-
ment. The Group also established a twelve nation Pre-Conference Coordinating
Committee to continue discussions in the hope of broadening areas of agreement, to
send missions to confer with interested countries and groups of countries, and, where
possible, to further develop the December draft.'
The Coffee Study Group's request was referred by the United Nations Secretary
General to the Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity
Arrangements (ICCICA) of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
'The draft was Coffee Study Group Committee I Document CSG-I-3o/6i(E) (Rev. 3). It was
released to the public on December 17, 1961, and is summarized in Coffee Annual 1961, p. 63.
"s See Coffee Study Group release of March 28, 1962, "Conclusions Reached at the Coffee Study
Group Meetings Concerning the Long-Term Agreement." The Pre-Conference Coordinating Committee
consisted of six importers (United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Sweden) and six
exporters (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, El Salvador, and two representatives of the Inter-African Coffee
Organization). All members of the Coordinating and Drafting Committee were represented.
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(ECOSOC), which recommended that a conference should be convened. Thereupon,
the Secretary General, under the terms of ECOSOC Resolution 296(XII), formally
convoked a United Nations Coffee Conference to convene on July 9, 1962 at United
Nations Headquarters in New York City?9
There are several reasons why the Coffee Study Group requested United Nations
sponsorship of the Conference. First, such a request was in accord both with the
recognized role of the United Nations in such matters and with previous practice
in the negotiation of commodity agreements. Second, such sponsorship would give
the Conference a global character and the highest possible dignity. Finally, United
Nations sponsorship would, as a practical matter, permit the Conference to avail
itself of the advantages of a well-equipped meeting place and the know-how and
experience of the United Nations Secretariat. The United Nations was, in turn,
willing to accept such sponsorship as part of its regular responsibilities and usual
functions in the international economic field-more particularly since the subject
matter of the Conference was in accord with ECOSOC policies and efforts.
United Nations sponsorship had, however, certain implications for the Conference.
In particular, it emphasized the necessity that the Conference comply with certain
ECOSOC requirements (which in turn incorporated standards set forth in the draft
Havana Charter for the proposed International Trade Organization) as regards both
Conference procedures and any agreement it prepared. The most important of these
requirements were that participation by all countries be permitted on equal terms and
that the exporting countries as a group and the importing countries as a group have
equal representation in any agreement.20
9 ECOSOC Resolution 296 (XII) of August 2, i95o authorizes the UN Secretary General to convene
commodity conferences and provides general rules applicable to such action, including the general nature
of the list of states to be invited and the preparation of a provisional agenda and rules of procedure. The
resolution specifically permits separate representation at such a conference by dependent territories.
By ICCICA decision, invitations were sent to all X04 members of the United Nations; several non-
members who had an interest in coffee; the members of the Coffee Study Group; the members of the UN
Interim Commission of the International Trade Organization (ICITO); the members of UN Food and
Agriculture Organization; and Rwanda and Burundi, which were only recently independent. Of course,
most countries were members of several or all of these organizations. Observers were also invited from
various UN specialized agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
"By virtue of ECOSOC Resolution 3 o(IV) of March 28, 1947 (U.N. Doc. No. E/4o3), UN com-
modity conferences are governed by the provisions of chapter VII (Inter-Governmental Commodity
Arrangements) of the Draft Charter of the International Trade Organization of the United Nations, ap-
pended to the Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the UN Conference on
Trade and Employment held at London, October 1946 (U.N. Doc. No. E/PC/T33). This is so even
though the draft charter never entered into force.
The provisions of chapter VII of the Draft ITO Charter cover such matters as: the permissible objec-
tives of commodity agreements (art. 47); the establishment of study groups (art. 48); the convening of
commodity conferences to recommend the adoption of inter-governmental arrangements (art. 49); and cir-
cumstances governing the use of regulatory agreements (art. 52). In particular, articles 51-55 of chapter
VII establish general principles which are to govern commodity arrangements. One of the most
important of these is the requirement that there be equal participation of importing and exporting countries
and an equal voice of each group in substantive issues (art. 51). Other provisions provide that the
governing body of each regulatory agreement should be a commodity council consisting of a representative
of each of the participating countries (art. 54); and that such agreements be limited to a duration of
five years, with a review of the provisions at intervals no greater than three years (art. 55). Paragraph
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Meanwhile, the preparatory work for the conference continued at both the
international and national levels.
On the international level, the Pre-Conference Coordinating Committee arranged
for a series of visits by the Secretary General of the Coffee Study Group, Dr. Joao
Oliveira Santos, and by other informed experts, to a number of countries throughout
the world to discuss preparations for the Conference, emphasize its importance,
darify the draft agreement, explain existing differences in viewpoint, urge high-
level representation, and stress the importance of responsible senior officials addressing
themselves to the essential issues in order that each Government would have a
thoroughly grounded position in advance of the Conference. The Pre-Conference
Coordinating Committee also considered certain other questions, including the
precise date at which the Conference was to meet, its general procedure and organiza-
tion, and the thorny but extremely important question of the selection of a
Conference Chairman. 1
On the national level, many Governments were engaged in the enormous amount
of preparatory work which precedes (or at least should precede) an international
meeting of this importance. Delegations had to be chosen and their financing
arranged; and positions and strategy debated, decided upon, and cleared at high-
policy levels. Moreover, even well in advance of the Conference, the business of
negotiation and bargaining with other countries had to begin, for a formal inter.
national conference is only one stage in a long and complex process of intergovern-
mental persuasion, pressure, and accommodation that commences well before the
conference convenes and may continue long after it closes.
The preparatory work undertaken by the United States Government was perhaps
typical of that in a number of countries. First, in meetings of high government
4 of section V of chapter V of the Preparatory Committee's Report notes, in commentary on the Draft, that,
subject to the principle of adequate representation of both exporting and importing groups, . . . voting
power may be distributed among countries according to the nature and extent of their individual in-
terests."
ECOSOC Resolution 3o (IV) recommended that, pending the establishment of the ITO, Members
of the UN adopt as a general guide in intergovernmental consultation or action with respect to commodity
problems the principles laid down in Chapter VII. The Resolution also established the Interim Co-
ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements (ICCICA).
Under the provisions of paragraph (h) of article XX, and the interpretative note thereto appearing in
Annex I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), discriminatory or restrictionist measures
undertaken by any contracting party in pursuance of obligations under any inter-governmental commodity
agreement conforming to the principles approved by ECOSOC in Resolution 30 (IV) of March 28, 1947
are not construed as violations of GATT.
1 The selection of an able Chairman is vital to the success of any commodity conference. He should
preferably be of international stature, impartial, not identified with any particular interest group, have
leadership ability, and have some experience with commodity or other economic conferences. Another
qualification for any chairman of a commodity conference is considerable physical stamina. In crucial
moments of the Conference, the Chairman's personal moral force may be all that stands in the way of
failure. The Chairman is usually paid by the Conference for his services.
The Chairman of the Coffee Conference, Mr. Mitchell W. Sharp, was a Canadian and had been
Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce of that country, resigning in x958 to enter private industry
and politics. He had participated in a number of commodity and trade conferences. He has recently
been appointed Minister of Trade and Commerce of Canada.
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officials, a United States Delegation to the Coffee Conference was determined upon
and appointed, and the necessary credentials prepared. Because of the importance
and complexity of the Coffee Conference, an unusually large delegation was selected,
consisting of eleven government officials from the Departments of State, Commerce,
and Agriculture, and eight advisers from private industry.22 W. Michael Blumenthal,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, who had played a leading
part in the work of the Coffee Study Group and had headed both its Committee
I and the Co-ordinating and Drafting Committee, was appointed Chairman of the
U.S. Delegation.
Second, in a series of meetings both within the Government and between govern-
ment officials and representatives of the National Coffee Association (the national
trade association generally representative of all segments of the United States coffee
industry), the basic position and objectives of the United States was determined as
well as the strategy it would pursue in seeking to attain these objectives. This posi-
tion was embodied in a formal confidential negotiating instruction issued to the
Delegation23
Third, and concurrently with these other steps, lawyers in the State Department's
Office of the Legal Adviser, with the assistance of lawyers in other agencies, were
examining the draft agreement from a legal point of view, with particular emphasis
on the obligations which the United States might be required to assume. In the
course of this examination, it became clear that new legislation would be desirable
before the United States joined any agreement along the lines of the one proposed,
22 The U.S. alternate Delegates were Mr. Henry Brodie and Mr. Paul E. Callanan, both of the State
Department's Office of International Resources. Most of the private advisers were members of the
National Coffee Association and of its Foreign Affairs Advisory Committee. A prominent part in the
negotiations was played by Mr. Jerome Jacobson of International Economic Consultants, Inc., who served
as a consultant on the Delegation under contract with the Agency for International Development.
"
2 Essentially, this United States position was as follows. The new long-term agreement should be
based upon realistic export quotas which should not exceed the best available estimate of probable world
demand. The United States should work hard for this objective, but should be careful. not to inject itself
in any way into the question of the allocation of country quotas within this global figure. The quota
system should cover all types of coffee to all destinations for all purposes, and should not leave any loop-
holes. Thus, no "ex quota" shipments to "new markets" should be permitted. The agreement probably
should not contain any specific price target, in view of the negotiating and administrative difficulties in
attempting to establish specific price ranges for each type of coffee, as well as the political problems
specific price targets would raise. Instead, prices should be generally left to the operation of market
forces under the quota system. However, it should be made clear that the agreement is not intended
to operate so as to bring about unwarranted price rises, and specific provisions to protect consumer
countries in this respect should be included. The agreement should provide for the free movement of
coffee on a non-discriminatory basis from all countries into consumption, and should seek to eliminate
obstacles to trade and fiscal burdens which inhibit increasing consumption. Finally, the agreement
should, as a key principle, recognize that overproduction is a root cause of the coffee problem, and
provide some means for the orderly reduction of production and stocks and the encouragement of economic
diversification in the producing areas. As will be seen, many, but not all, of these objectives were
achieved.
For the general United States position as set forth by Mr. Blumenthal in a statement to the Conference
on July so, the day after its opening, see 47 DEP'T STATrx BUs.s 234 (1962). And as to general US.
commodity policy at this time, see Blumenthal, International Commodity Problems, 46 DEP'T STATE BuLL.
997 (x962).
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and, further, that it was impracticable to attempt to secure such legislation prior to
the anticipated adjournment of Congress. 24  For these and certain other reasons, it
was decided that, if the United States should join a coffee agreement, it would do
so through formal treaty procedures, with the advice and consent of the Senate and
concurrent passage of the necessary implementing legislation, rather than by execu-
tive agreement. It was therefore apparent that the United States could not hope
to become a party to any new agreement which might be negotiated until after the
new Congress convened early in x963.
Fourth, action was taken both through meetings with foreign embassy officials
in Washington and through American embassies abroad to inform foreign govern-
ments of the importance which the United States Government attached to the
success of the Conference, the need for thorough and timely preparation, and the
necessity for each country to view the issues realistically and to be prepared to
compromise if the Conference was to succeed. Individual meetings between State
Department officers and key foreign officials were held to set forth the United States
views and, where these corresponded to the views of the foreign government con-
cerned, to establish plans for concerted action at the Conference. In addition, key
congressional leaders were advised of the forthcoming negotiation and of the United
States position and objectives.
Finally, in accordance with State Department procedures, permission was re-
quested and received from the Secretary of State for the United States Delegation
to enter into the formal negotiation of a coffee agreement at the forthcoming Con-
ference?5
With preparations and procedures such as these completed, the various delegations
proceeded to New York for the Conference's opening.
IV
THE CONFERENCE
The United Nations Coffee Conference convened on July 9, x962 at United
Nations Headquarters, New York City. Delegates from fifty-eight nations and
"'Difficulties were apparent particularly with respect to the obligations contained in the Coffee Study
Group draft requiring importing countries to limit imports from non-participants. Although § 204 of the
Agricultural Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 200 (1956), as amended, 76 Stat. 104 (x962), 70 U.S.C.A. § 1854
(Supp. 1963), could be argued by its terms to permit such limitation, a study of the legislative history of
that Act and the section in question suggested the advisability of securing new legislation to accomplish
this objective.
Other legal questions concerned such matters as authority to require imports of coffee into the
United States to be accompanied by certificates of origin, authority to grant immunity to the Inter-
national Coffee Organization if it engaged in commercial coffee transactions, and the consistency of such
a quota agreement with United States antitrust law and policy. Also relevant was the provision in Pub.
L. No. 495, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (July 10, 1952) which prohibits U.S. representatives to international
organizations of which the United States was not then a member from, in the absence of specific
authorization, "making any commitment requiring an appropriation of funds for a contribution by the
United States in excess of 33YS per centum of the budget of such international organization."
5 This was done in compliance with the Department's "Circular 175" procedure, more fully
described in Bilder, The Offce of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign
.4fairs, 56 AM. J. IN'L L. 633, 651-52 (1962).
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observers from thirteen other countries and three United Nations specialized agencies
were present.26 In terms of the number of countries affected, the strength of the
opposing interests, and the range of problems covered, the Conference was to con-
stitute one of the most difficult economic negotiations attempted in recent years.
Scheduled to finish by August 17, it was not to recess until August 25, and would not
finally adjourn until September 28, more than two and one-half months after its
commencement.
The express task of the Conference was to formulate a new long-term agreement.
To achieve this objective, the fifty-eight countries represented had to resolve a number
of difficult questions. The most important of these were the total level and division
of quotas and the manner of their adjustment; the price objectives of the agreement
and their relation to quotas; how to deal with the problem of production and stocks;
the form of any new international organization to be established and the distribution
of power within that organization; how to handle the problem of obstacles to trade
and consumption; the treatment of non-participants; and the means by which the
agreement was to be enforced.
As to each of these questions, and a number of others, there were strong differences
of opinion and divisions of interest between fairly well-defined though overlapping
groups of countries. The politics of the Conference consequently tended to be on the
basis of "blocs."
The most important of these groups, and their principal interests and objectives,
were the following:
(i) The Importers. While generally committed in the interest of international
cooperation to attempting to assist exporting countries in achieving a
workable solution to the coffee problem, the importers as a group were
for the most part anxious to "do their duty" with the assumption of as
few obligations as possible. In particular, they were under the political
necessity of ensuring that their consuming public was not subjected to
any marked increase in coffee prices, or their domestic trade to any more
burdensome administrative regulations than were essential to the Agree-
ment's operation.
(2) The Exporters. The exporters as a group wished to achieve a functioning
agreement capable of at least stabilizing coffee prices at existing levels,
and hopefully, of raising them. Within the group of exporters, however,
interest in an agreement and ideas as to how general objectives were to
be achieved differed greatly. Each foresaw that onerous burdens and
restrictions would have to be assumed by the exporting countries, but
each hoped to minimize the particular burden or restriction falling on it.
" The countries represented by delegations and observers are listed in UN Coffee Conference
Press Release EC/2149 of August 25, 1962. International organizations sending observers were the
Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the
International Monetary Fund.
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(3) The Major Trading Countries. The principal importers and exporters, such
as the-United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil, Colombia,
and the other nations represented on the Pre-Conference Coordinating
Committee were particularly interested in achieving a workable agree-
ment, but felt that their predominant importance in coffee matters should
be clearly recognized both in the negotiation and the administration of the
Agreement.
(4) The Smaller Trading Countries. The smaller traders were less certain
of the value to them of an agreement controlled by the principal ex-
porters and importers, and were afraid that their interests would be
ignored in the process of negotiation and administration. Since under
"one country--one vote" conference procedures their voting weight at
the Conference was potentially greater than that of the principal trading
countries, they intended to use this influence to the fullest in the negotia-
tion to make sure that they fully participated in the making of Conference
decisions and that their particular interests were protected.
(5) The Latin American Producers. The Latin American producers were being
particularly hurt by declining prices and therefore had a special interest
in achieving an agreement. However, they wanted an agreement which
would tend to maintain their existing market position as against further
encroachment by the African producers. Equally important, they wanted
an agreement which would give them increased access to the European
market by lessening or abolishing European internal taxes, quantitative
restrictions, and preferences.
The Latin American group was divided into two subgroups:
(a) Brazil and Colombia, the two dominant world producers, both
heavily dependent on coffee, had a special stake in an agreement.
Brazil exerted a particular influence in the negotiations since it
was clear that in any price war which might result from the
possible failure of the Conference, it was in a position to create
serious difficulties for other producers.
(b) The thirteen Latin American producers other than Brazil and
Colombia were organized (together with Puerto Rico) into the
Federation of Coffee Producers of America (Federation Cafe-
latera de America or FEDECAME). Many of these were heavily
dependent on coffee for foreign exchange and considered an
agreement to prevent further price erosion a necessity. Others
were remaining uncommitted in order to see how the land lay
and what advantage or disadvantage from their particular stand-
point an agreement might entail.
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(6) The African Producers. The African producers were organized into the
Inter-African Coffee Organization (IACO). These African producers
had managed to secure a constantly increasing share of the world market.
Moreover, the franc-zone African countries enjoyed special treatment in
the Common Market countries. The IACO countries as a group were
therefore anxious for flexibility in any agreement and fearful of inhibi-
tions on what they considered would be their expanding share in world
trade. Some of these countries were only newly independent, and still
under the technical leadership of former colonial administrators, and were
not sure that an agreement would actually serve their interests.
The African producers were also divided into several subgroups:
(a) The newly-independent countries of the Franc Zone, profiting
particularly from French and potential European Common Mar-
ket preferences;
(b) Tanganyika, and the United Kingdom exporting territories of
Kenya and Uganda (since become independent); and
(c) Ethiopia, Nigeria, and certain other countries.
(7) The Common Market Countries. The importing countries of the European
Economic Community, with France frequently acting as spokesman, were
concerned, as all importers, in incurring as few obligations as possible.
These countries were particularly interested in resisting any commitments
to Latin American producers with regard to the reduction of taxes or
quantitative restrictions, or any weakening of the preferred position of
African coffees within the Common Market.
These blocs were not, of course, either clearly defined or unchanging. Instead,
the interests of each country were expressed sometimes through one group, some-
times through another, and sometimes independently. The actual process of negotia-
tion was thus a complex and constantly shifting pattern of coalition, pressure, and
counter-pressure as each participant constantly weighed and balanced its various
interests and bargaining positions-what it could afford to give up for what gain-
in the light of its overall objections and the shifting positions of other countries.
How the ultimate balance would be struck was still to be seen.
A. Procedure
Because of the number of countries involved and the many issues to be resolved,
the procedural aspects of an international conference constitute one of its most
interesting and important features, and may largely determine its success or failure.F
The most complex and difficult negotiation can be brought to a successful conclusion
27 For a comprehensive general discussion of the procedure of international conferences, see VLAr.Mm
D. PAsrmOV, A Gum TO TsE PRAcnca OF INTERNATIoNAL CONFERENcEs (1945); and see SIR ERNEST
MACON SATOW, A GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRAcC'scE 303-23 (4th ed. Sir Neville Bland, 1957).
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
by careful organization, the entrusting of key questions to effective committees, and
the wise selection of committee chairmen. The simplest negotiations as regards
substantive problems may dissolve into chaos as a consequence of the lack of adequate
procedural planning.
Fully recognizing this fact, the Pre-Conference Coordinating Committee had
given considerable attention to the organization of the Conference. Even so, these
arrangements proved less than completely effective in maintaining a constant
momentum of decision by Conference committees. Major deadlocks were en-
countered which on several occasions brought the negotiations to a complete halt,
and the Conference verged on disaster as its closing date approached with many vital
issues unresolved.
The procedure and organization of the Coffee Conference were, with certain
exceptions, typical of most commodity conferences. Both as of possible general
interest in itself and in order to make clearer the ways in which the Coffee Confer-
ence diverged from accepted conference practice, the typical procedure of a United
Nations commodity conference may be described in some detail.
A typical conference meets (either in plenary or in major committee) in a single
large room, the various delegations being seated in alphabetical order in various tiers
facing a central podium. On the podium are seated the chairman and the principal
officials of the conference secretariat, including the conference executive secretary and
the conference legal adviser (who are usually members of the staff of the United
Nations Secretariat), and sometimes a special consultant on the technical matters
of the conference. In the plenary and most committees, the conference secre-
tariat provides simultaneous interpretation, keeps summaries of each meeting, and
prepares, translates, and distributes all proposals and conference documents. 8
The plenary of the conference, which is its formal embodiment as a meeting of
official representatives of Governments, and which alone has authority to make
decisions binding the conference, is convened by a temporary chairman, who is
usually a representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations. Meetings
of the plenary are generally open to the public. The provisional agenda and rules of
procedure29 prepared prior to the conference by the Interim Coordinating Committee
2 At the Coffee Conference, interpretation and translation were provided in English, French, Spanish,
and Russian (all official UN working languages), and Portuguese. Because of the importance of Brazil
and Portugal (due to Angola) in the Conference, Portuguese was used for the first time in a UN Con-
ference as a working language. Since China was only an observer, it was decided that Chinese, which is a
UN working language, would not be used.
The Conference Secretariat's summary records of meetings, together with the various proposals, all
numbered according to a special system by committee and date of issuance, provide complete documenta-
tion of the Conference. However, since these Conference documents are not generally available, they are
not referred to in this article.
The problem of prompt issuance and particularly translation of proposals and documents is an im-
mense and formidable one for any conference secretariat. On a number of occasions in the Coffee Con-
ference, sharp debates on what at first appeared to be substantive questions turned out to be the result
of misunderstandings arising from errors in translation.
" The procedure of commodity conferences is in general fairly informal, and rules of procedure
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for International Commodity Arrangements are proposed and adopted. The con-
ference then unanimously elects its chairman, who has usually been agreed upon
beforehand by at least the principal governments represented and who serves in an
individual rather than governmental capacity, and several vice-chairmen, who are
usually heads of different delegations so chosen as to recognize important countries,
different interest groups, and different geographic areas.
Next, the various committees are set up. A credentials committee is appointed
and instructed to report back to the conference later in the session. The plenary also
establishes the executive committee which, like a committee of the whole in a parlia-
mentary body, is in fact the same representatives simply meeting under another
name, and elects the chairman of the conference as the head of the executive com-
mittee. Finally, the plenary appoints a steering committee, consisting of the con-
ference chairman and vice-chairmen and the chairmen of any principal committees
established by the executive committee. The task of the steering committee is to
guide and coordinate the work of the conference.
The conference plenary then adjourns into executive committee. From this time
on, almost all of the principal business of the conference will be done in the meetings
of the executive committee and its subordinate committees, which are dosed to the
public, and the conference plenary will meet in public session only to make formal
decisions.
The executive committee commences its work by hearing a long and usually
rather tedious series of delegation statements setting forth the views of each country
on the various issues involved. These may represent anything from firm positions
to simply opening bluffs in the negotiations. Simultaneously, the executive com-
mittee establishes a series of committees under it, to each of which is assigned a
particular range of problems. When a draft agreement has been prepared prior to
the conference, which is usually the case, it is typically accepted as the conference
basis of discussion, and the committee assignments are made on the basis of an
allocadon of particular draft articles to each of these committees. 30 These committees
in turn ordinarily establish subcommittees or working groups to consider special
problems. In addition, the executive committee usually establishes a legal and
drafting committee of not more than five or six lawyers from various delegations,
are rarely invoked. Thus, commodity conferences typically conduct their business by a consensus taken
by the chairman rather than by formal vote. Nevertheless, procedural questions may in certain instances
become very important and on a few occasions formal votes-even roll call votes-may be demanded.
Thus, the Coffee Conference was almost wholly tied up for several meetings in an extremely complex
procedural situation arising out of the relatively insignificant question of what international organizations
should be invited to attend the Conference in a consultative capacity. Originating in a proposal by Italy
to invite the European Economic Community, the matter rapidly became one of politics and prestige,
and a variety of other organizations were also proposed. After prolonged debate, great procedural
confusion, and a number of votes (including a roll-call vote), the EEC, the OAS, and the Arab League
were ultimately invited.
" There is inevitably a problem of overlapping jurisdiction between the various committees, and a
need for the closest control by the Chairman and the Steering Committee in order to avoid duplication
of work and confusion.
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who act largely in an expert and personal capacity, to provide legal and drafting
services to the conferenceY'
As each committee reaches decisions on the matters entrusted to it, it reports these
decisions back to the executive committee, most frequently in the form of new or
revised draft articles proposed for inclusion in the agreement. Usually the reported
articles are sent first to the legal and drafting committee, which may make various
suggestions or drafting changes before sending the articles up to the executive
committee. The executive committee hears and debates the various reports and
may either accept them, instruct the relevant committee to make certain changes or
study the matter further, or, more rarely, reach its own decision without returning
the matter to committee. The actual proposed articles of the agreement usually
receive three different "readings" during the conference-that is, the executive
committee is given three chances to comment on each article (though the third
reading is usually pro forma). These readings must commence fairly early in the
conference if this procedure is to be completed.
When all the generally agreed articles have finally been adopted at third reading,
the executive committee proceeds to adopt the text of the agreement as a whole. The
legal and drafting committee then goes over this text to ensure consistency and
clarity, and makes any necessary drafting changes. Finally, the conference meets in
plenary session and formally adopts the agreement and any final act or other resolu-
tibns which may be proposed.
Turning now to the Coffee Conference itself, it will be seen that the Conference
followed the initial procedures just described but was forced by lack of time to
drastically vary the procedures with respect to readings and the final adoption of a
text.
At the initial meeting of the Coffee Conference Plenary, the provisional agenda 2
"x The formal organization of a conference is, of course, only a partial picture of its actual working.
Thus, in the Coffee Conference, the members of the Pre-Conference Committee, the importers, IACO, and
FEDECAME all held informal but regular meetings throughout the Conference, and particular problems
would lead to informal caucuses of the various interest groups concerned. Much of the business of
actual negotiation is done by delegations in the corridors, at lunches or dinners, or in hotel rooms. At the
Coffee Conference, such informal meetings were particularly important due to the unwicldly size
of Economic Committee II. The Conference Chairman may play a leading part in bringing about
compromises during such informal meetings.
It might also be mentioned that a well-organized country delegation may be a key factor in its
achieving of its objectives. The Brazilian delegation was outstanding in this respect. In contrast with
many other delegations, some members of the Brazilian delegation were present at almost every conference
meeting, regardless of its importance, and a continuous flow of reports and daily staff meetings kept
the Chairman of the Brazilian delegation and all of its members constantly apprised of every development.
T- ;rhe provisional agenda prepared by ICCICA for the Coffee Conference was as follows:
i. Opening of the Conference;
2. Adoption of Agenda;
3. Adoption of Rules of Procedure;
4. Election of Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen;
5. Credentials of representatives to the UN Coffee Conference, x962, (a) appointment of Credentials
Committee, (b) Report of the Credentials Committee;
. Disciission of International Measures designed to meet the special difficulties which exist or are
expected to arise concerning coffee;
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and rules of procedure were adopted, and a Credentials Committee appointedV3 As
prearranged, Mr. Mitchell Sharp of Canada was unanimously elected Chairman,
and the heads of delegation of Brazil, the United States, the Malagasy Republic, and
Italy were elected First, Second, Third and Fourth Vice-Chairman, respectively.
The Executive Committee was then established, which in turn, over the next week
or so, established three major committees: (i) Economic Committee I, open to all
countries, to which was assigned the subjects of production and stocks, obligations
of importing countries, and financial and technical matters; (2) Economic Committee
II, with a limited membership, to deal with the central questions of quotas, prices, and
obstacles to trade and consumption; and (3) Administrative and Legal Committee
III, open to all countries, to which was assigned the administrative, legal, and
organizational provisions of the Agreement. It was generally accepted that the
Coffee Study Group draft would constitute the basis of discussion. In addition, it
soon became necessary to establish a special Statistical Committee of four experts
acting in a personal capacity. Finally, though a Legal and Drafting Committee was
in fact never formally established by the Executive Committee, a small Legal and
Drafting Group eventually came into de facto existence,
The key committee was, of course, Economic Committee II, with responsibility
concerning questions of quotas, prices, and obstacles to tradef 5 For this reason,
the question of the composition of this committee became one of the first major
problems of the Conference, and deserves some discussion.
On the one hand, it was clear and generally agreed that Economic Committee I1
simply could not deal with the complex issues it was assigned unless its membership
was severely limited, and that the major producers and consumers most concerned
7. Establishment of an Executive Committee and other committees as required;
8. Preparation of an international agreement embodying international measures considered desirable;
9. Consideration and adoption of resolutions, Final Act, and so on.
zo. Any other business.
'The Credentials Committee consisted of the United States, USSR, France, Mexico, and the Ivofy
Coast. The question of credentials may have strong political overtones due to differing Western-Soviet
Bloc attitudes concerning the status of the Republic of China and certain Communist regimes. In qom-
modity conferences, however, these questions are usually handled by each group making pro forma
statements of their position for the record. At the Coffee Conference, the Republic of China was only an
observer. The USSR and Cuba were represented by delegates, and Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and
Rumania by observers. Political questions are generally not prominent in commodity conferences, which
are primarily concerned with technical questions, although Cuba: on a few occasions in the Coffee Confer-
ence raised political matters.
" The membership of the Legal and Drafting Group, as originally established by the Legal Sub-
committee of the Administrative and Legal Committee, consisted of the Conference Legal Adviser
(Mr. Gurdon Wattles of the UN Legal Staff), and lawyers from the United States, the United Kingdom,
German, Brazilian, Colombian, and Ethiopian delegations. The Legal Group worked principally in
English.
s A large committee of this type made up of delegations is not the only way of handling the
difficult and delicate task of quota allocation. Some commodity conferences (e.g., the UN Sugar Confer-
ences) have used instead the device of entrusting the allocation of quotas to a small panel of particularly
respected conference leaders or "wise-men," who hear each delegation's case in camera and impartially
attempt to work out what they consider the fairest and most acceptable compromise. This system "has
much to recommend it.
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had to play a principal role in the making of key decisions as to these issues. For
these reasons, the Pre-Conference Coordinating Committee had suggested that the
membership of this committee be limited to twelve or fourteen major exporters and
importers. On the other hand, it was clear that the decisions of the Committee
were the basic ones which the Conference would make, would vitally affect the
nature of any agreement drawn, and were thus of central importance to all of the
participants in the Conference. The smaller producers in terms of volume argued
that limited membership on ,Economic Committee II was inconsistent with the
central concept of sovereign equality of states in such conferences, and would amount
to a rigging of the Conference against the interests of smaller states. Each pointed
out the vital importance of coffee in its economy and contended that no one but
itself could adequately protect its interests.
The problem of the composition of Economic Committee II was finally resolved
by an increase of the membership of the Committee to sixteen and the consequent
inclusion of several of the smaller producers and consumersf0 In addition, there
was a firm undertaking that all Conference participants would have an opportunity
to state their positions before the full Committee, and a further understanding that
the Committee would report weekly to the Executive Committee. Even so, over
a week passed before Economic Committee II was established and began functioning,
and the scars of this controversy never really healed. The complaint of the smaller
states that their interests were being ignored persisted throughout the Conference and
beyond, despite the fact that the need for restricted membership on Economic
Committee II was generally conceded to be simply a fact of life of the Conference.
Aside from the problem of the composition of Economic Committee II, the most
important procedural problem the Coffee Conference faced was that of completing
its work within the time available. As is typical of many such conferences, the
Conference proceeded at a leisurely pace for several weeks and then completed its
work in a great rush. The first three weeks were devoted almost entirely to
preliminary matters-the setting up of the various committees, statements by each
delegation of its position, preliminary negotiation, and the collection of statistical
material. During this period, the various delegations were holding their cards very
close to their chests. It was not, in fact, until the fourth week of the Conference
that the serious work of negotiation was really begun. The issues proved too difficult,
however, to admit of quick solution. As the sixth week (the scheduled final week)
of the Conference opened, many of the major problems were still unresolved, and
less than half of the articles were reduced to even reasonably agreed language. There
had as yet been no formal "readings" of any of the articles in Executive Committee.
" The problem was complicated by the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany originally attended
the Conference only as an observer, but later, at the strong urging of many governments, changed its
status to that of a formal participant. As the world's second largest consumer, it was an obvious candidate
for a seat on Economic Committee II. The final membership of Economic Committee II was: Exporters-
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Tanganyika, Portugal, Ivory Coast, and India; and
Importers-United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Sweden, Australia, and Germany.
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Still hopeful of achieving an agreement, the Steering Committee decided to
extend the Conference for several days. It was clear, however, that even with this
extension, there would not be time to follow the usual procedure of readings in
Executive Committee and approval of a final text. How was this problem to be
handled?
A procedure was first proposed whereby the Conference would receive and
approve the individual Committee reports without passing on the texts of individual
articles, would instead refer these articles to the Legal Group for incorporation into
the final text of an agreement, and would then recess. The text prepared by the
Legal Committee would, upon its completion, be circulated to the participating
Governments. In six weeks' to two-months' time, the Conference would reconvene
for one or two days for approval of the Agreement prepared by the Legal Group-
hopefully without change.
It became apparent upon further reflection, however, that any delicate com-
promises reached in the last weeks of negotiation would, under this proposed
procedure, run a grave risk of becoming unstuck during the long interval which
this plan contemplated prior to final approval. There seemed a dangerous possibility
that some of the participants might use this period to seek better bargains, and
that the Conference would as a result have to begin all over again when it recon-
vened. It was therefore necessary to find some procedural device which could
be worked out in the remaining few days, yet have the result of effectively binding
the participants to compromises reached during the present Conference session. The
prospect that negotiations might have to be reopened at some future date was
simply more than the tired delegates could face.
To accomplish this result, the Chairman, on August 20, proposed an alternative
procedure whereby the Plenary of the Conference would actually adopt the texts of
articles "for inclusion in the Agreement." This would fix the substance of the
articles but not their form. These articles would then, as in the previous plan, be
referred to the Legal Group which would be given broad discretion to make drafting
changes, produce a final text, and distribute it to Governments. The Conference
would reconvene in about a month only to approve or disapprove the Legal Group's
work, but would not have authority to make substantive revisions in the Agreement,
since the texts of the individual articles would already have been finally approved
in Plenary. That is, the choice would be only to accept or reject the completed
text. This procedure was ultimately adopted.
Agreement on the final procedure to be followed did not, however, mean that
the Conference was yet in a position to utilize it. As the end of the seventh week
approached, a consensus was still lacking on the most basic issues of the Agreement-
quotas, quota adjustment, prices, and voting procedure. In terms of Conference
procedure, Economic Committee II had not yet submitted its report to the Executive
Committee. Since many of the principal delegates had to leave to meet prior
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commitments and the United Nations facilities could not be made available any
longer, it was clear that further extension of the Conference was impossible. On
the afternoon of Thursday, August 23, the Chairman grimly announced that unless
agreement on outstanding issues was reached in time for approval of the articles
to begin on the following day and to be completed by Saturday, August 25, the
Conference would adjourn sine die. This was the moment of truth. All that
night the lights at the United Nations building remained on. A continuous series
of meetings of the various groups, hallway conferences, and whispered negotiations
occurred in a frantic effort to arrive at some acceptable compromise before the
deadline. Finally, at about 5:30 a.m. on Friday, August 24, a final bargain on the
quota issue was struck between the principal participants and the basis for the
report of Economic Committee II was laid.
On Friday, August 24, only a few hours after the final compromise had been
reached, a very weary Executive Committee approved the less controversial pro-
visions of the Agreement in an article by article reading. By Saturday, August
25, the report of Economic Committee II had finally been prepared and distributed,
and the quota provisions and remaining articles of the Agreement were formally
agreed. The Conference then approved a series of final resolutions including one
which: (i) requested the Legal and Drafting Group to arrange the provisions of
the articles of the text in a clear order, ensure their coherence, and make necessary
.drafting changes, and (2) requested the Executive Secretary of the Conference to
transmit these texts to the Governments and to arrange for the Conference to meet
together for one day on September 28 to adopt a final resolution 7 After hearing
a series of final statements, including attacks by a number of disgruntled delegations
on the quotas set for them by Economic Committee II, the Conference recessed at
i :3o p.. on Saturday, August 25.
The recess of the Conference was but the beginning of the work of the Legal
and Drafting Group. For four days, from Sunday, August 26 through Wednesday,
August 29, the Drafting Group was in almost continuous day and night session
redrafting and completely rearranging the text. On the afternoon of August 29,
its revision was reviewed at an informal meeting attended by the Conference Chair-
man, members of the Conference Secretariat, and delegates from certain of the
principal delegations. The final revised text was then prepared in the other *official
Conference languages by the Conference Secretariat and distributed to the participant
Governments.
On September 28 the Conference reconvened. Following a long series of state-
ments by various delegations, principally of a laudatory nature, the text as submitted
was formally approved in Plenary and opened for signature. Twenty-three states
signed the Agreement on that day.
1 The others resolutions related to "Improvement of the Operation of the Quota Provisions" and
"Transitional Measures."
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B. Issues
Every international negotiating conference has to decide a great number of
questions concerning the provisions to be incorporated in the final agreement. These
questions may either be raised by the draft used as the basis of discussion, or raised
by delegations during the negotiation as independent proposals.
Fortunately, very few of these questions are real issues in the sense of requiring
actual negotiation. First, many proposals are on their face so clearly necessary
or so generally acceptable as not to require real debate-only well-organized dis-
cussions indicating the common sense of their inclusion. In the case of the Coffee
Conference, this was the situation with respect to such matters as the basic decisions
to establish a quota system, to create an international coffee organization, and to have
this organization collect information and make studies. Second, as to many other
proposals, the opposition of important groups is so strong that it is apparent that
such proposals cannot possibly be included in any agreement which is to have
any wide measure of support or chance of success. Thus, it was quite clear from
the beginning of the Coffee Conference that importers as a group would not accept
any specific obligation to finance diversification schemes in exporting countries
or to finance the carrying of surplus stocks, and that exporters as a group were
unwilling to accept any specific commitments whereby their domestic production
policies and stocks would be subject to international direction or control.
The negotiations thus centered about certain key issues on which there was
fairly evenly-balanced controversy, but as to which compromise was possible. The
most important of these issues were the following.
i. Quotas.
It had been generally accepted long before the Conference that any long-term
coffee agreement should operate primarily through a system of export quotas. First,
such a quota system would deal most directly with the basic problem of oversupply
through control of the total flow of coffee onto the market. Second, the previous
agreements had been primarily of this type and had justified the essential work-
ability of such controls to their membership. There was consequently no debate
on this basic question.
A principal issue at the Conference, however, and the one on which it almost
foundered, concerned the actual fixing and allocation of these quotas. Two problems
were involved: (i) how large should the total overall quota (i.e., the total amount
of exports of coffee allowed all Members) be, and how was this total quota to be
adjusted; (2) what should be the relative share of each exporting country in this
38 In early Coffee Study Group discussions, proposals were made that the Agreement include a
buffer-stock arrangement and that stockpiled surpluses be placed under international control. However,
in view of the great amount of surpluses and the enormous funds that would be required to finance a
buffer-stock operation, that plan was not adopted. A multilateral contract scheme was never seriously
considered, since an agreement of this nature could not effectively deal with basic coffee problems of
constantly declining price and overproduction.
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total quota, and should these relative shares themselves be flexible and subject to
adjustment?"9 These issues were primarily fought out between the various producer
blocs.
As concerns the question of the total quota, all producers were in principle agreed
that this quota should be "realistic" in the sense of not exceeding total demand
at current prices. There was, however, a constant tension between two possible ways
of arriving at this figure. On the one hand, it made sense to first arrive at such
a "realistic" total figure on the basis of an economic analysis of probable total
imports, and then to divide this total up between producing countries. On the
other hand, there was a practical pressure to arrive at this figure by first setting
individual quotas acceptable to each country and then totalling up these individual
quotas to reach a global figure. Since the total of all individual quota desires would
far exceed current or foreseeable demand, this latter method was virtually certain
to produce an unrealistic total quota figure.
Projections as to the likely world demand for coffee over the next five years were
produced by the Statistical Committee and were rather quickly agreed upon by
Economic Committee II. Moreover, there was little disagreement that an Interna-
tional Coffee Council should be established and given the power to revise the level
of total quotas yearly in response to changing estimates of world demand, and that
this Council should also have special power to revise total quotas at any time if
sharp fluctuations in price indicated market imbalance. However, despite agreement
on these principles, the exact figure for total quotas was inevitably interrelated
with the individual quota problem and had to await the resolution of that issue.
The real negotiations, therefore, centered about the question of "the division of
the pie"--the share which each country was to have in any global quota, and the
general basis on which such shares were to be calculated. Of course, each country
argued for a system of allocation which would tend to increase its relative share;
and many countries suggested that their case was unique and their needs greater,
and that they should therefore be entitled to special treatment and a higher quota
than other countries. Thus, the large established producers wished quotas to be
based primarily upon available supply and historical shares of the market. More-
over, in order to further protect their existing market positions, they wished the
respective shares of the various exporting countries to be firmly established in the
agreement and not to be subject to later negotiation. The newer African producers,
on the other hand, with developing productive capacity and a belief that the trend
in consumer preferences would continue to favor their coffees, wished quotas
established on the basis of potential production, with relative shares to be subject
to flexible adjustment based upon the demand for different types of coffees as indi-
'" These questions were complicated by the interrelation of quota decisions with possible decisions on
the questions of price. Moreover, as a negotiating matter, the Latin American countries related the quota
problem to the problem of obstacles to trade. There was considerable debate in Economic Committee II
as to the order in which these questions should be taken up.
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cated by price or the degree to which quotas were actually utilized.40 The smaller
countries wished the factor of economic dependence on coffee to be taken into
account, or a special exemption for small producers from quota requirements 1
Countries with political dislocations such as the Congo wanted special account taken
of their situation in this respect, particularly if their exports had declined because
of such difficulties. A further complication was that, as a practical matter, each
delegation felt it politically unacceptable to come back from the Conference with
a quota smaller than it had received under the short-term agreement, or one that
would not permit virtually all its present-and in some cases, its potential-
production to be marketed.
Only late in the Conference were even the general principles for the final
negotiation of quotas agreed upon. Under this scheme, each country's relative share
in the total quota was to be based upon its average exportable production in its
choice of either the two coffee years i961-62 and 1962-63, or the four coffee years
i959-6o through 1962-63, the last year in each case of course being an estimate.
This average figure was then to be reduced by a percentage varying roughly with
the size of that country's production.42 That is, the largest producers, with the
biggest stake in market stability, would sacrifice most by withholding a greater
share of their exportable production. Actual quotas would also reflect special
problems of particular exporters. The relative shares so established would be in
general inflexible and would not be renegotiable for a period of three years, at
which time the question of relative individual quotas would be re-examined. How-
ever, escape hatches would be provided in the form of waiver provisions, and
more particularly in the form of withdrawal provisions permitting any country
to get out of the Agreement quickly and easily if it found its interests seriously
damaged under the actual operation of the quota scheme.
Generally speaking, this compromise favored the Latin American concept of
,0 The "quota reserve.' system proposed by the IACO countries would have required the Council to
withhold a certain proportion of the global quota for later allocation to various countries in accordance
with market demand for coffees of particular types, as reflected by price increases.
"As an extreme example, it was at one time proposed that only producers exporting more than 5%
of world coffee exports be subject to quotas. This would, in effect, have subjected only Brazil and
Colombia, and in some years the Ivory Coast and Angola, to the quota system.
"Z While the United States played a leading part in discussion of the level of total quotas, it attempted
to avoid involvement in the negotiation of individual quotas. Nevertheless, difficult problems were created
for the U.S. Delegation by the Conference's decision to use as the statistical basis for quota negotiations
the estimates of exportable coffee production issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. These
statistics were bitterly attacked by certain delegations, particularly Ethiopia and the Congo (I6opoldville),
as a gross underestimate of their production. The U.S. Delegation took the position that the Depart-
ment of Agriculture figures were published solely for the guidance of U.S. officials and the trade and
were never intended to serve as a basis for quota negotiations, and that consequently the decision to use
or not to use these statistics was entirely up to the Conference. A further problem arose from the fact that
new Department of Agriculture statistics were scheduled to appear on September 27. There was conse-
quently a tendency by certain of the exporters to favor delaying the quota negotiations until those statistics
were out, in the hope that the new statistics would buttress their bargaining position. This problem was
avoided when a corridor rumor appeared to the effect that the Department of Agriculture would probably
postpone the issuance of new statistics for an undetermined period.
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rigidity rather than the African concept of considerable flexibility and "elastic quotas"
responsive to "consumer preference." However, as a concession to the African
position, a special Conference resolution (which was later adopted on August 25)
was to provide that the Council shall make proposals to the Members not later
than the third year of the Agreement to improve the operation of the quota provisions
in relation to such objectives as the free operation of competitive forces and exercise
of consumer freedom of choice as reflected by price movements.
Even with basic agreement on these principles, however, the actual decisions on
country quotas were, as previously indicated, agreed to only in the very last minutes
of the Conference, and were strongly affected by the varying negotiating skills and
bargaining power of the different delegations. Moreover, in the final days, pressure
from individual countries for increased individual allocations, and upward adjust-
ments occurring in the last minute give-and-take, had the effect of in fact forcing
the total quota figure beyond the projected figure for total world demand. In order
to take care of this inflation of the total basic quota figure, the total annual quotas
(i.e., pernitted exports) for the first year of the Agreement's operation had therefore
to be expressly limited to ninety-nine per cent of the total basic quotas.
Nor was final agreement on quota matters unanimous. A few countries were
deeply disturbed by their failure to secure higher quotas, and the evening of Satur-
day, August 25, just before the Conference recess, was taken up by a series of
protests by Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and India
on this score. Even at the meeting of September 28, when the Agreement was
formally approved, Ethiopia, India, and Ecuador indicated that they might not
sign the Agreement for this reason.
2. Prices.
Closely associated with the quota problem was that of price. Was the Agreement
to contain specific price objectives as a guide to the establishment of quotas, and if
so, what prices? There was very little open debate on this issue. The importers,
while fully supporting measures to arrest the decline of prices, were opposed to
marked price increases. A few exporters, on the other hand, wished to use the
Agreement as an instrument to force prices up to the high levels prevailing in the
immediate post-war years. Some importers had mixed interests. Thus, France,
already committed to support the price of coffees produced by its former African
territories at higher than market levels, proposed a system of "price indicators" so
devised as to permit an escalation of price.
It quickly became apparent that it was politically impossible for the importing
countries to accept any provisions which would actively seek sharp increases in
prices. Moreover, it became more gradually clear that negotiation of specific
figures and price spreads for the various types and grades of coffee was an impossible
task in the time available, if it in fact could be done at all. It was decided, therefore,
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that rather than try to establish a detailed price system for each kind of coffee-all
kinds are substitutable to some degree-prices would instead be left to be determined
by the market indirectly through the adjustment of quotas, with the general
objective in setting such quotas being that the level of prices not decline below the
general level of prices in 1962. In order to protect the interests of consumers against
possible price manipulation by producers, the Council was given special authority
to adjust quotas at any time by a simple majority vote, should sharp price fluctuations
occur.
3. Obstacles to trade.
Aside from quotas, the most bitterly fought issue at the Conference concerned the
demand by the Latin American producers that the countries of the European
Economic Community undertake measures to reduce and remove internal taxes,
quantitative restrictions, and trade preferences operating to the detriment of Latin
American exports to that area4
From the first days of the Conference, the Latin American producers insisted
that an agreement was impossible in the absence of some effective commitment to
this effect by the Common Market countries. The Latin American producers were
generally supported by the United States, which favored the non-discriminatory
treatment of all imports regardless of origin. The Common Market countries, on
the other hand, took a firm position that they were unable and unwilling to
negotiate such questions at the Conference. They argued that the Coffee Conference
was not a proper forum for such matters and that in any event they simply did
not have the authority individually or collectively to commit the European Economic
Community to particular action in this regard. The Common Market countries were
generally supported in their stand by the newly-independent African countries of
the franc zone, who were the principal beneficiaries of existing and contemplated
preferences.
" The strong feeling of the Latin American countries concerning Common Market preferences, quotas,
and taxes was but one facet of the general and continuing concern of primary producing countries with this
problem both in the coffee and other commodity areas. This concern is frequently manifested at interna-
tional meetings. Thus, Resolution C.3 adopted by the Punta del Este Conference appointed a committee
to negotiate the elimination of restrictions on coffee consumption. More generally, a GATT Declaration
of November 13, xg6i set forth certain guiding principles designed to reduce obstacles to exports of less
developed nations. In June 1962, a meeting of the Special GATE Group on Trade in Tropical Products
in Geneva established a subgroup to study, on a commodity-by-commodity basis, the effect of preferential
arrangements on such exports, and to develop alternative proposals. The Special GATT Group recom-
mended that the International Coffee Agreement should include the principles of the GATT Declaration
of November 13, ig6s.
Shortly after the Coffee Conference, on November 15, 1962, the United Nations Economic Committee
overwhelmingly approved a thirty-five power resolution calling for an international conference on trade
problems. This resolution included a clause asking the preparatory committee for the Conference to
consider placing an item on the agenda entitled "Measures for the removal of tariff, non-tariff and
other trade barriers arising from industrialized countries, whether individually or from economic groupings,
which adversely affect the exports of developing countries and the expansion of international trade in
general." N.Y. Times, November 16, z962, p. s, col. 8; p. 1o, col. 4-
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For a considerable period, it appeared that the Conference would founder on this
question alone, and at one point Brazil ceased active participation in Conference
debates for several days in protest against the apparent unwillingness of the Common
Market countries to grant concessions on this matter. Finally, in the sixth week
of the Conference, following weeks of complex and behind-the-scenes negotiation
(some of which occurred at high government levels), an acceptable compromise was
reached. Under the language ultimately agreed to, importing countries were not
to be firmly committed to specific action to remove such obstacles. However, the
principle was generally recognized that practices such as preferences and high in-
ternal taxes are undesirable and should be eliminated, and a procedure was established
whereby measures to remove such obstacles are to be reviewed by the International
Coffee Council.44
4. New Markets.
Another major question was how inclusive the quota system should be, and, more
specifically, whether shipments to the so-called "new markets" of Eastern Europe,
Africa, and the Far East whose consumption of coffee was traditionally low, either
because of low income or low preference for coffee, should be excluded from this
system.
A number of producers argued for such an exclusion on the grounds that exports
to these areas could not substantially affect the market situation, and that un-
hampered competition in the development of these markets would lead to their
more rapid expansion. On the other hand, broad exemptions of this nature were
opposed by the United States and various other importers, who pointed out that
exports which had been permitted to such destinations under the short-term agree-
ment, had in fact (particularly in the case of East Germany and Bulgaria) been
re-exported to traditional markets and had constituted a principal quota-evading
device under that agreement. They argued that such an exemption would similarly
weaken the new Agreement.
The pressure for some sort of recognition of the "new market" principle proved
too strong, however, to be defeated, and a carefully controlled exception was
provided for exports to such areas. It was agreed that "new market" countries
should be specifically named, and that total permissible exports to these destina-
tions should be established by the Council. Such exports were to be closely watched;
" An interesting aspect of this debate was the strong objection expressed by the USSR and Cuba to
language in the finally agreed text of what eventually became article 47(3) listing "operations of
Government import monopolies and official purchasing agencies" among the "measures which may to a
greater or lesser extent hinder the increase in consumption of coffee." Despite strong assurances by the
Conference Chairman and various delegations that this language was not intended to have any political
overtones, the USSR and Cuban delegates asserted that the phrase in question amounted to an attack
on Socialistic economic systems, which conduct their foreign trade through State monopolies, and that
retention of this language would constitute a barrier to signature. Both the USSR and Cuba in fact
signed the Agreement, but in both cases with a declaration that "the above mentioned reference cannot
be interpreted as applicable to the foreign trade monopoly" of their country.
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re-exports from such markets were to be prohibited; and, in the event of re-export
to traditional markets, the offending "new market" country would be stricken from
the list of permissible "ex quota" markets.
5. Obligations of Importing Countries.
A principal change envisioned by the new agreement as contrasted with the
short-term agreement was the participation of importing countries. Their role was
intended to be largely that of helping to police the arrangement and to ensure com-
pliance with the quota provisions. While it was clear from the start that the obliga-
tions of importers would be fewer and less far-reaching than those of exporters,
considerable debate occurred as to the exact nature and extent of these obligations.
In particular, questions arose whether importing countries should be required to
restrict imports from countries not parties to the Agreement and to prohibit importa-
tion of coffee from Members when shipments were not accompanied by particular
documentation. On the one hand, the exporting countries, supported by the United
States and a few other importers, maintained that strict controls of this nature were
necessary if the Agreement was to work. On the other hand, a number of European
importing countries argued that restrictions on imports from such outside countries
would be inconsistent with their present efforts to liberalize trade, and that detailed
documentation requirements would create unnecessary and burdensome difficulties.
The issue was finally resolved in favor of rather strict importer obligations.
Until the Agreement's membership represented ninety-five per cent of world exports,
imports from outside countries were to be restricted to average quantities from such
countries imported in certain base periods. Moreover, within ninety days after the
Agreement came into effect, importers were not to permit entry of coffee without
prescribed certificates designed to identify the coffee's country of origin for quota
purposes.
6. Voting.
How were countries to share in the decisions of the new coffee organization?
The principle was accepted, as it had been in previous commodity agreements, that
exporters and importers should vote as separate groups and that a system of weighted
voting should be adopted under which countries would in general have voting power
in proportion to their relative shares in exports and imports.45 In the particular
"For examples of weighted voting in international economic agreements other than commodity agree-
ments, see article V( 3 ) of the International Bank Articles and article XII( 5 ) of the International Monetary
Fund Articles. An interesting discussion of why Governments are willing to accept weighted voting in
international economic agreements is contained in Metzger, Settlement of International Disputes by Non-
Judicial Methods, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 408, 416-17 (1954), which deserves quotation at length:
"[The rationale for weighted voting] is simple, sound, and has not been seriously questioned. Nations
have acknowledged the justice of a system which allocates voting influence on the basis of relative invest-
ment ... . They appreciate that where concrete economic cooperation among nations of unequal wealth
and power takes the form of unequal commitments which, in turn, correspond closely to their in-
equalities of wealth or trade in the subject-matter of the particular agreement, it is both logical and
LAw AND CONTnMPoRARY PROBLEMS
case of coffee, however, the relative shares of Brazil in exports (almost forty
per cent) and of the United States in imports (almost fifty-two per cent) were
very large. Should these two countries be permitted a veto power over the
decisions of the new organization, and would such large voting power on their
part not leave most of the less important trading countries, as a practical matter,
virtually powerless?
Early in the Conference, it became evident that there was a strong general
feeling that the voting power of the United States and of Brazil should be limited
to some degree. This was manifested first through proposals that an absolute
limit be placed on the number or proportion of votes which any one country could
exercise. It was expressed secondly through proposals that a certain proportion
of the total votes be distributed equally between countries as "basic votes," and that
only the remainder of the total votes be distributed on a weighted voting basis,
thus diluting the weighted voting influence of the larger countries. Third, it was
urged that simple majority votes rather than two-thirds majority votes (which could
be vetoed by the larger countries) apply to many decisions. Finally, there were
suggestions that no single Member should be permitted to block action which all the
other Members wished to take-i.e., that there be no possibility of a veto by the
larger countries. Brazil and the United States recognized the concern of the other
countries with their large voting influence, but were reluctant to give up an effective
veto over decisions of a nature conceded to be of enormous importance to them
in terms of their proportionate interests and stakes in world trade in coffee.
In the final days of the Conference, an acceptable compromise was worked out.
The United States agreed that no single country should exercise more than forty
per cent of the votes within its importing or exporting group, though both the
United States and Brazil rejected suggestions for a thirty per cent limitation. More-
over, it was settled that of the Iooo votes to be exercised within each group, up to i5o
were to be allocated equally to the members of that group on a "basic vote" basis.
inescapable that those nations whose risks are greatest expect to influence those risks to a maximum
degree, through influencing decisions within the framework of the rights and obligations set out in the
agreement itself.
"Moreover, nations with smaller voting influence (as a consequence of thcir smaller commitments)
appear to be willing to participate in this system because certain other key circumstances usually prevail:
(i) the commitments themselves, in terms of money or materials, are measurable in concrete terms, so
that extraneous considerations of 'prestige,' 'face,' etc., are palpably irrelevant; (2) the framework of
rights and obligations established in the agreements is usually a tight one; the decisions to be taken by
weighted voting, while important, must be within this framework; as a consequence, the risk that
unforseen obligations will thereby be imposed on those nations with small votes is minimized; (3) the
agreements are either for relatively short periods . . . or contain simple withdrawal provisions ...
Consequently, the damage which can be done to small nations is greatly minimized, since they can
withdraw from the agreements immediately or within a very short time if they consider that their
interests are being given short shrift. This circumstance, which is well known to the nations
with larger voting influence, acts as a brake upon any inclination they might have to wield their voting
power in an unrestrained manner, for they might find that, if they did so, the agreements would become
unworkable because of withdrawals by dissatisfied nations with smaller voting power, or that their
renewal on that basis would be impossible to negotiate."
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Only the remaining votes after this distribution were to be allocated on a weighted
voting basis. As to the votes necessary for important decisions, it was agreed that
while two-thirds distributed majorities (i.e., two-thirds of the votes in the exporters
group and importers group counted separately) would be required for most im-
portant decisions, less stringent requirements would apply to Council action to meet
sharp price fluctuations. Finally, a formula was devised whereby no single country
could alone veto a proposal; instead, the negative votes of at least two countries
would be required. Thus, the United States would have to find the support of at
least one other country if it wished to defeat a proposal.
7. Powers of the Executive Board.
Another issue concerned the scope of authority to be granted the fourteen-
member Executive Board. Some countries felt that if the Agreement was to operate
effectively, the Executive Board, as the Organization's only continuing body, must
necessarily be granted broad powers, particularly with respect to adjustment of
quotas. They argued that only such a continuing and workable body could act with
the promptness required for decisions in this area. Other countries were strongly
opposed to a broad grant of powers to the Board. They felt that important decisions
affecting all the Members should be kept solely in the Council, on which all Mem-
bers were represented, instead of being delegated to the Board, which could not
truly represent all the Members. In back of this attitude, there was probably a fear
by some countries that the Board, if granted broad powers, might attempt detailed
interference into the market.
This issue was eventually decided in terms of a reservation of almost all sig-
nificant decisions to the Council, and a resulting strong restriction on the authority
of the Board.
8. Membership.
One of the most troublesome conceptual and drafting problems which the
Conference faced concerned the question of membership, and particularly whether
membership in the Organization should be restricted to sovereign states (which alone
had capacity to become parties to an international agreement), or whether pro-
vision should also be made for separate participation by dependent territories and
by groups of states which might form economically-linked producing units.
There was little debate over the proposition that countries where the metropolitan
territory was a net importer, but which had one or more dependent territories which
were important exporters, should be permitted to join the Organization separately
as regards their metropolitan territories and such dependent territories.46 More
controversial, however, was the question whether groups of exporters which might
" The principle of separate representation of exporting dependent territories in commodity agreements
was accepted in chapter VI of the Draft ITO Charter. See also article III of the Second International
Tin Agreement and article XXVI( 5 ) (c) of GATT.
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wish to participate jointly should be permitted to do so, and if so, under what condi-
tions and with what rights.
The possibility of group membership was of particular importance to the IACO
countries. First, a number of these countries (e.g., some of the franc-zone nations)
did in fact function economically as a group. Second, the African countries wished
to retain in so far as possible a group influence as a counter-balance to the influence
of the Latin American countries. In addition, group membership offered the possi-
bility of greater flexibility in quotas, since a single group quota could potentially be
allocated among the group's members according to circumstances and needs.
It was finally agreed that separate membership in the Organization by exporting
groups of countries would be permitted. However, in the case of group membership,
the individual members of the group would be required to assume individual as
well as joint responsibility for the performance of their obligations under the
Agreement, and the group would have to establish to the satisfaction of the Council
that it was in fact economically interdependent in coffee matters. Evidence that
such countries had (i) previously been recognized as a group, or (2) shared
a common and coordinated commercial and economic policy in relation to coffee and
a coordinated monetary and financial policy, would be acceptable for this purpose.
9. Headquarters.
Where was the new International Coffee Organization to be situated? Latin
American countries argued strongly for either New York or Washington on the
basis that the United States was the world's principal importer and the center of
the world coffee market. European and African countries argued equally strongly
for London on the grounds that it was more geographically convenient to the largest
number of countries, and was already the seat of the Wheat, Sugar, and Tin Councils.
An unspoken consideration behind the debate was a feeling that proximity of the
Headquarters to one or more of the principal blocs of Members would have some
bearing on the influence those countries were able to exert in the new Organization.
Ultimately, on the final day of the Conference, the Latin American countries were
outvoted on this issue and London was selected. The United States and the United
Kingdom both abstained in the vote.
xo. Entry into Force.
How great a participation should be required before the new Agreement came
into effect? Since the effectiveness of the Agreement would dearly depend not only
upon membership by a large number of countries, but also on membership by
countries accounting for a considerable proportion of the world's export and import
trade, it was decided to establish requirements based on both of these criteria. The
major Latin American producers, supported by the United States, were anxious
that the Agreement and its system of quota controls should enter into force as soon
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as possible, and thus favored a relatively low percentage of ratifications for this
purpose. The European importing countries, on the other hand, were concerned
about their obligation to restrict imports from non-joiners and argued that the Agree-
ment should not take effect until it had been accepted by a relatively high proportion
of countries. The figures eventually agreed upon-twenty exporting countries and
ten importing countries accounting respectively for at least eighty per cent of world
exports and imports in i96i-represented a compromise between these two positions.
In order to get the Agreement into force more quickly, it was also decided that a
procedure should be provided for provisional entry into force based upon the deposit
of notifications of intent to seek ratification, as well as upon the deposit of formal
instruments of ratification.
C. The Lawyer's Role in the Conference: The Legal and Drafting Group
As it developed, lawyers played an important role in the negotiation and drafting
of the Coffee Agreement. At first, however, during the preparation of the Coffee
Study Group draft and in the early stages of the negotiation, their potential contribu-
tion was largely ignored. This circumstance may justify a brief digression in this
article on the work of lawyers at such international commodity (or other) con-
ferences, and the services which they can most usefully perform.
Generally speaking, only the largest and most important delegations to interna-
tional conferences on economic or political matters (as opposed to legal matters)
will include legal advisers, although frequently many delegates have legal back-
grounds. At the Coffee Conference, the delegations of the United States, United
Kingdom, Germany, Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, and a few other countries spe-
cifically included lawyers. In addition, the United Nations Secretariat usually
furnishes a member of its legal staff as Conference Legal Adviser, and did so at the
Coffee Conference. While the Legal Adviser's views are of course not binding
on the Conference, they generally have great weight.
The first responsibility of an attorney assigned to a delegation is, of course, to
assist his delegation in its work. His legal skills will be utilized in such matters as
the interpretation of instructions, the drafting of proposals and statements, the
analysis of proposals made by other countries (particularly those which might create
difficulties under his own country's law and practice), and the handling of legal
problems of a general nature which arise in the course of the negotiations#7 More-
over, the Delegation lawyer does his share in the lobbying activities which are an
indispensable part of any negotiation. He is usually also responsible for any legal
matters concerning the Conference which arise before or after the actual negotiations,
"' One such question involved a proposal under which Members would have been allowed to pay
their dues to the Organization in "kind," i.e., in coffee, which the Organization would then sell. Aside
from the danger of the possible use of "payments in kind" as a device to circumvent quotas, such
commercial dealings by the Organization might have raised serious problems as to whether blanket
privileges and immunities should be extended to it.
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such as helping in the preparation of a negotiating position consistent with national
law, securing any necessary negotiating authority or credentials, assisting in the
technical aspects of signature and ratification, and preparing and bringing into effect
any necessary implementing legislation or regulations.
Perhaps the most interesting function of a lawyer in connection with such a Con-
ference, however, is in relation to the preparation of the draft used as a basis of
discussion and in his work as a member of the Conference Legal and Drafting Com-
mittee.
Since the principal objective of such international conferences as the Coffee
Conference is the preparation of an international agreement, which is often an
extremely complex legal instrument, legal experts must obviously play a role. Thus,
at a minimum, Foreign Office lawyers must take major responsibility for the prepa-
ration of the "final clauses" (which relate to the method by which Governments
become party to the Agreement, its entry into force, duration, territorial application,
amendment, and the like), and must carefully go over the final text of the Agreement
to ensure its substantive and drafting consistency. What is not so well recognized,
however, is the great contribution that lawyers can make more generally towards
the success of a conference's work, particularly in clarifying the basic issues and
focusing debate on real rather than verbal questions.
The lawyer's particular usefulness arises from the fact that a multilateral con-
ference has no practical procedural alternative but to discuss the matters before it
on the basis of some sort of written text. If this text is clear and unambiguous and
presents the substantive issues squarely, the conference can, as it should, devote all of
its time to discussion and resolution of the substantive policy questions involved.
On the other hand, if the conference has before it draft articles which are vague
and ambiguous, or which conceal the substantive issues in drafting problems, the
participants will inevitably spend a great amount of time debating what are essentially
drafting issues in an attempt to arrive at a new and useful basis of discussion.
At the extreme, the inertia inherent in a draft accepted as a basis of discussion may
cause a premature hardening of attitudes; and the conference may be "frozen into"
a poorly prepared draft and never be able to escape the limitations and confusions
it embodies.
Unfortunately, a tendency to view the lawyer as a "mere technician," coupled
perhaps with a certain fear that he will improperly intrude himself into the dis-
cussion of substantive issues, can still be found at some international conferences,
and the substantial benefits that adequate legal services can provide in easing and
speeding conference work are not always utilized. This point can perhaps be
made more clear by contrasting a somewhat idealized drafting procedure with the
procedure actually utilized at the Coffee Conference.
In principle, legal experts should be both represented in the preparations for an
international conference and present at every stage of its actual work. It is of great
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importance that the pre-conference draft which is to constitute the basis of dis-
cussion should be carefully gone over by a team of legal experts to make sure that
its provisions are well drafted, internally consistent, and clear. Ideally, the decisions
facing the conference respecting each draft article should be indicated in notes to the
preparatory draft, or in draft alternative texts.
Upon the convening of the conference, one of its first acts should be the appoint-
ment of a legal and drafting committee of not more than five members, made up of
legal experts from the various delegations (serving primarily in an individual
capacity rather than as country representatives) and the conference legal adviser.
This Committee should serve directly under the plenary and the conference chairman.
It should be constantly available to render legal and drafting assistance to any of the
other conference committees, which should be encouraged to seek such assistance,
since frequently the lawyer's special experience in international organizational tech-
niques may be of considerable help on substantive problems. If possible, the legal
committee should attempt to organize itself in such manner that one of its members
is present at each meeting of every major committee, so that it will be informed as to
the background and intent of the draft articles sent to it.
Each draft article should automatically pass through the legal committee on its
way to the executive committee, and the legal committee should be authorized to
refer such articles back to the reporting committee for clarification if necessary.
The legal committee should review the complete text of the agreement before its final
submission to the plenary for final approval.
The history of the preparatory work for the Coffee Conference and of the work
of its Legal and Drafting Group indicates that the procedure at the Coffee Con-
ference fell far short of this ideal, and illustrates some of the typical problems that
lawyers may face.
First, the Coffee Study Group draft, which formed the Conference basis of
discussion, was drafted without the assistance of Foreign Office legal experts. What-
ever the draft's merits otherwise, it was, from a strictly legal point of view, am-
biguous and out of line with accepted international drafting practice in a number
of respects.4 As a consequence, the Legal Group had to spend more than a week of
its short-lived existence reworking considerable sections of the draft, including all of
the "final clauses" and the provisions on membership and certificates of origin. In
the meantime, the Conference had no alternative but to base its discussion on the
"In a number of cases where the Coffee Study Group draft could usefully have simply picked up
standard language already used and accepted in other commodity agreements, it did not do so. This
was particularly true as regards the "final clauses."
This suggests the need for the preparation of a useful and practical handbook on the drafting of final
clauses for multilateral (and perhaps also bilateral) agreements. The "Handbook of Final Clauses"
prepared by the Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat (ST/LEG/6 of
August 5, 1957) is solely a compilation of clauses from existing agreements, and does not attempt
to establish standard forms or discuss the drafting problems involved. Hopefully, such a handbook
could simplify drafting problems without obscuring the obvious need to re-think such clauses in the
light of the substance of the particular agreement involved.
LAw AND CONnMPORAY PROBLEMS
text of the Coffee Study Group's draft, and an inordinate amount of time was wasted
in the various committees on what were essentially drafting rather than substantive
matters.49 More confusion occurred when, late in the Conference, the Legal Group's
revisions of substantial portions of the Coffee Study Group's draft were finally placed
before the various committees.
Second, the Legal Group was not established until August x, more than three
weeks after the Conference was convenedY0 Particularly in view of the difficulties
just referred to, this left too little time for the group to do its work. Moreover, rather
than being set up directly under the Plenary and the Conference Chairman, the
Legal Group was established as a subgroup of the Legal Subcommittee of the Admin-
istrative and Legal Committee, which was in turn under the Executive Committee.
In fact, the Group could not and did not utilize this long "chain of command."
Also, the Group's original terms of reference were strictly limited to the technical
preparation of the "final clauses," though in practice, its work necessarily had to
expand quickly to embrace a review of all the articles of the Agreement. In general,
the limited time available to the Group and the great pressure it was under seriously
interfered with its ability to follow the work of the Conference as a whole, and
hampered the effectiveness of its operations.
Third, the procedure which the Conference was forced to adopt respecting its
approval of the final text placed a considerable burden of responsibility upon the
Legal Group. In place of the Conference's original, unduly narrow view of the
importance of legal services to its work, which had resulted in the ignoring of
lawyers in the preparation of the draft and a delay in the establishment of the
Legal Group until the fourth week of the proceedings, the Conference under its
final procedure gave the Legal Group, if anything, excessive powers of discretion.
Thus, the Resolution of August 25 in effect referred to the Legal Group a group of
hastily approved articles, many of which had never passed through the Group for
drafting changes5 or for a study of their mutual consistency. The Group was
directed to forge these articles into a finished and coherent final text, without in
theory changing any of the substantive understandings which they reflected. In
practice, of course, the Legal Group had in many cases no choice but to make sub-
stantial changes in these often ambiguous draft articles. This was done, however,
with the frightening realization that any such changes were subject to attack at the
" Perhaps the most important rule of procedure in international conference-as in any such meeting-
is never to attempt to draft in large committees. In view of the number of people concerned, the diverse
views represented, and the difficulties arising from different languages and imprecise interpretation, the
-task is simply impossible.
" While an able member of the UN Secretariat's Office of Legal Adviser was present as Conference
Legal Adviser, his duties-which included attendance at all Executive Committee meetings and the
'keeping of careful records of decisions bearing on the texts of the various articles--were simply too
:arduous to permit him to perform single-handedly more than limited drafting functions.
', Thus, due to limitations of time, the quota articles included in the final report of Economic Com-
anittee II were approved by the Executive Committee without thorough examination or revision by the
Legal Group.
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final September 28 meeting of the Conference, and might well furnish a basis for the
Conference failing to adopt the Agreement. While adding to the interest and
excitement of any legal committee's work, such a delicate situation is certainly one
any conference will do well to avoid.
In the case of the Coffee Conference, this story had a happy ending, but things
might have worked out less well; at the extreme, these difficulties could
possibly have resulted in failure by the Conference to produce an effective instru-
ment.50 2 The experience of the Coffee Conference emphasizes the urgent need for
international lawyers to make a determined effort to bring home to Governments
and to delegations to international conferences an understanding of the absolute
necessity and the real advantages of an adequate and timely use of legal expertise
in both the preparation and the work of such meetings.
V
Tim AFTERMATH
Despite many difficulties, the Coffee Conference was thus successful in its task
of negotiating and adopting the text of a new Agreement. From the viewpoint
of either the economist or lawyer, the International Coffee Agreement, 1962 (which
is summarized and commented on in the Appendix) is a less than perfect instru-
ment. Substantively, all of the history and hopes, conflicts, and compromises which
combined to mold it have resulted in a weaker and less comprehensive arrangement
than some might have desired. Technically, the haste and at times confusion which
accompanied its drafting have left their mark. Nevertheless, in terms of the practical
problems and negotiating realities which the Conference faced, the Agreement repre-
sents a remarkable achievement.
The opening for signature of the Agreement did not, however, mean that the
work of the negotiators had yet finished. Though the form of the Agreement had
been fashioned, a great deal remained (and still remains) to be done in order to
bring it to life and guide it in its first steps.
By November 30, 1962, the last day permitted for signature, fifty-four countries
had signed the Agreement. 3  Since thirty-two of these were exporting countries
representing more than ninety-five per cent world exports and twenty-two were
importing countries representing more than ninety-four per cent of world imports,
ratification or notification by these countries would suffice to bring the Agreement
into force. The most important and pressing piece of business for signatory delega-
"'Luckily, the various members of the Legal and Drafting Group worked well together and were
able to reach decisions quickly. Had this not been so, it seems in retrospect unlikely that the Legal Group
could have done an acceptable job in the time available.
"The fifty-four Governments signing the Coffee Agreement by November 3o, 1962 are listed in UN
Press Release L/Xo41 of December 4, 1962. Evidence of general world-wide support for the Agreement
was given on November 22, 1962, when the UN General Assembly's Economic and Financial Committee
approved 82 to i a resolution strongly endorsing the Agreement. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1962, p. 45,
col. 3.
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tions was therefore the obtaining of these ratifications or notifications as rapidly
as possible. Immediately upon returning from the Conference, most of these delega-
tions bent their efforts to putting the appropriate machinery into action for securing
the necessary approval by their Governments.
Action by the United States was, of course, a sine qua non to entry into force of
the Agreement. The process of United States Government action in this respect was
consequently of particular significance and may serve to illustrate some of the
procedures and problems involved. As will be seen, this process was to prove more
difficult and time-consuming than originally anticipated, and even at the time of
this writing legislative action has not yet been completed.
As previously indicated, the Administration had decided well in advance of the
Conference that, if an acceptable Coffee Agreement was prepared, it would be
submitted to the Senate as a treaty, rather than being acted upon as an executive
agreement. This decision was based upon various factors, including the importance
of the Agreement, the desirability of obtaining implementing legislation prior to
formal ratification, and the precedents established by ratification of both the Wheat
and Sugar agreements as treaties. However, since Congress was scheduled to
adjourn only shortly after the Conference itself adjourned, it was apparent that
it would be impossible to obtain Senate approval to ratification and congressional
enactment of implementing legislation prior to the convening of the Eighty-eighth
Congress in January, 1963. Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate the interest of the
United States in the Agreement and to permit study of its provisions by the staff
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the interim, the necessary papers were
quickly prepared and the Agreement formally submitted by the President to the
Senate on October 4, 1962, less than a week after it had been signed." During the
congressional recess, draft legislation to implement the Agreement was prepared by
the Department of State with the assistance of the other Government agencies
concerned, and was first informally and then formally cleared within the Executive
branch. At the same time, preliminary inter-agency meetings were held to explore
the practical and administrative problems which might arise as regards the carrying
out of United States obligations under the Agreement.
In January i963, the Eighty-eighth Congress convened, with an Administration
request before it for rapid action on the Coffee Agreement. However, hearings were
not held by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations until March 12, 1963. The
hearings indicated strong support for ratification by both the Administration and
the National Coffee Association, and little apparent public opposition. 5 On May
"These documents consisted of: (i) a Report to the President from the Acting Secretary of State
explaining the Agreement; (2) a certified copy of the Agreement; and (3) a Message from the President
to the Senate transmitting the Agreement and the Report. They are published in Senate Document
"Executive H," 87 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
" See Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on Executive H, 87 th Cong., 2d
Sess., The International Coffee Agreement, 1962, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (z963). Principal witnesses
appearing in support of the Agreement were the Hon. George G. McGhee, Under Secretary of State for
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13, the Senate Committee Report on the Agreement was issued, reporting it favor-
ably without reservation and strongly recommending that the Senate give its advice
and consent to ratification.58 The Committee noted, however, its concern as to the
United States embarking on such a program for a period as long as the five year term
of the Agreement with no provision for legislative review in the meantime. It
therefore recommended that Congress limit the initial validity of the implementing
legislation to a period of two years, so as to ensure congressional review of the
Agreement after some experience had been accumulated regarding its operations.
Moreover, the Report was not unanimous. Presaging possible difficulties in Senate
floor debate, a minority view filed by three of the seventeen members of the Com-
mittee urged that the Senate reject the Agreement, on the grounds that it would
create burdens for the American consumer without substantially contributing to the
long-term solution of the coffee problem.
On May 20, the resolution of ratification was taken up by the Senate, discussion
on ihe question continuing through May 2I.7 It was by this time apparent, and was
confirmed in the opening debate, that opposition of unexpected strength had de-
veloped, based principally on the fear that the Agreement would cause a rise in coffee
prices, doubt as to the efficacy of the Agreement to solve the coffee problem, and
concern that Senate approval might be interpreted as sanctioning proposals to enter
into such commodity agreements on a broad scale. Since a Senate resolution
advising and consenting to ratification of a treaty constitutionally requires con-
currence by two-thirds of the senators present, opposition by even a substantial
minority was a most serious development, and it was evident that only strong ad-
vocacy on the Senate floor and Administration assurances could avoid real trouble.
Accordingly, a special effort was made by leading senators to point out the need
for the Agreement, to emphasize the protection it afforded United States interests,
and to stress the unfavorable foreign relations impact which would be created by
Political Affairs, testifying for the Administration, and John F. McKiernan, President of the National
Coffee Association, testifying on behalf of that organization.
Questions asked of the witnesses by the members of the Senate Committee evidenced their principal
concern with the potential effect of the Agreement on American consumers, particularly as regards any
possible price increases, and clearly brought out the fact that U.S. participation in the Agreement was
regarded by the Administration and the Committee as justifiable primarily in terms of foreign policy
interests rather than in terms of particular consumer benefits. The Committee also showed an interest
in levels both of import duties and taxes and export dudes and taxes in other countries; the quota given
Cuba under the Agreement; the procedures for U.S. withdrawal if this became desirable; the relationship
of the Agreement to the U.S. Aid program; and the possibility of the Council's extending the Agreement
beyond the five-year basic period. As to this last point, the Committee Chairman expressed his feeling
that the Administration should not vote in the Council for extension of the treaty beyond a five-year
period without permitting the Congress to first examine the Agreement's operation and give its con-
currence to such an extension.
"' See Senate Executive Report No. i on the International Coffee Agreement, 1962, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963).
" The Senate debate appears in the Congressional Record for May 2o and 2z. See 109 CoNG. REC.
8512-29 and 8551-56 (daily ed. May 2o, 1963), and 109 CONG. PMc. 8618-25 and A32oo-ox (daily ed.
May 21, x963).
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its rejection by the Senate. To support this effort, Acting Secretary of State Ball, on
May 20, wrote Senator Humphrey a letter making clear the Administration's view
that the Agreement was not self-executing and that implementing legislation
would be required to meet certain United States obligations, and expressing the
Administration's concurrence in the Foreign Relations Committee's proposal that
the implementing legislation be limited to a period of about two years, thus per-
mitting congressional review of the question of continued United States participation
in the Agreement at the end of that period." Presumably, if Congress failed to
renew this authority, the United States would withdraw from the Agreement under
the provisions of article 68, which permits such withdrawal on ninety days' notice.
These combined efforts, the State Department's assurances, and, in particular,
Senate recognition of the important foreign relations aspect of ratification of the
Agreement, were undoubtedly significant in obtaining increased support for the
Agreement.5 9 When on the afternoon of May 2 the yeas and nays were ordered
and the roll called, the resolution of ratification was carried by a vote of 69 to 20,
with ii Senators not voting. The motion to notify the President of Senate advice
and consent to ratification was carried without objection.
With Senate advice and consent to ratification secured, the next step prerequisite
to ratification was the obtaining of implementing legislation. During the week
following the Senate action, the draft International Coffee Agreement Act prepared
by the Administration and incorporating the Senate Committee's suggestion for a
two-year limitation was submitted to both houses of Congress and then brought to
the attention of the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Ways and Means.!' By this time, however, it appeared that final action by Congress
" This letter is set forth at o9 CONo. Rac. 861g (daily ed. May 21, 1963). The letter suggested that
the expiry date be September 30, 1965, in order to coincide with the closing date fixed in article 72 of the
Agreement for its overall review by the Council.
"' That these assurances had a substantial effect is apparent from Senator Dirksen's statement sup-
porting the Agreement (io9 Coxo. REc. 8624 (daily ed. May 21, 1963)). As to the importance placed
on the foreign relations aspect of ratification, see, for instance, Senator Mansfield's statement that the
Agreement "is absolutely indispensable to our country's good relations with the Latin American Republics"
(109 CoNG. Rac. 8624 (daily ed. May 2, x963)) and Senator Fulbright's statement that "The initial reper-
cussions of [any rejection of the Agreement by the Senate] will be political in nature and they will be
severe, particularly in Latin America" (io9 CoNG. REc. 8619 (daily ed. May 25, 1963)).
0 The draft bill has the short title, the "International Coffee Agreement Act of 1963." Its key
provision is section 2 which provides:
"Sec. 2. On or after the entry into force of the International Coffee Agreement, 1962, and
for such period prior to September 30, 1965 as the Agreement remains in effect, the President
is authorized, in order to carry out the provisions of that Agreement, to:
(s) regulate the entry of coffee for consumption or withdrawal of coffee from warehouse for
consumption, induding (a) the limitation of entry or withdrawal from warehouse of coffee imported
from countries which are not Members of the International Coffee Organization, and (b) the
prohibition of entry of any shipment from any Member of the International Coffee Organization
of coffee which is not accompanied by a certificate of origin or a certificate of re-export, issued by a
qualified agency in such form as required under the Agreement;
(2) require that every export or re-export of coffee from the United States shall be accompanied
by a certificate of origin or a certificate of re-export, issued by a qualified agency of the United
States designated by him, in such form as required under the Agreement;
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on the bill might possibly be delayed until the late summer or even the late fall of
1963.
This delay raised new and extremely serious problems. It was considered of
great importance that the new Agreement become actually operative by the beginning
of the coffee year commencing October i, 1963. For arrangements to be made, it
was necessary for the International Coffee Council to meet during the summer, and
preparations were already underway for sessions in London commencing in July.
However, the Council could obviously not meet until the Agreement entered pro-
visionally or definitively into force, and this could not occur without some form of
United States action--either formal ratification or deposit of an instrument notifying
the Secretary General of its intent to ratify. Each of these alternatives raised legal
and policy problems.
After careful consideration of the alternatives, and despite the fact that the
Administration would have preferred to defer any action until the implementing
legislation had been secured, it was decided that the only practicable choice was for
the United States to deposit an instrument of notification. This instrument was
drafted so as to dearly reflect the actual situation-that, while Senate approval had
been secured for ratification, the implementing legislation necessary for the United
States to fully carry out commitments under the Agreement had not yet been
obtained. On June 24, 1963, this United States notification of intention to ratify the
Coffee Agreement was deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations.6 1
The deposit of this notification by the United States brought the Agreement with-
(3) require the keeping of such records, statistics and other information, and the rendering of
such reports relating to the importation, distribution, and consumption of coffee as he may from
time to time prescribe;
(4) take such other action, and issue and enforce such rules and regulations, as he may consider
necessary or appropriate in order to implement the obligations of the United States under the
Agreement."
For comparison with legislation implementing other commodity agreements, see § 411 of the Sugar
Act of 1948, as amended, 70 Stat. 221 (1956), 7 U.S.C. § 1161 (1958), and the International Wheat
Agreement of 1949, as amended, 70 Stat. 966 (1956), 7 U-S.C. § 1641 (1958).
To meet United States commitments, it will also be necessary for the President to designate the
International Coffee Organization under the International Organizations Immunities Act, 59 Stat. 669
(1945), 22 U.S.C. § 288 et seq. (1958). The Coffee Study Group is so designated. Exec. Order No.
10943, May 1g, g6i, 26 Fed. Reg. 4419 (i96i).
01 See Dep't of State Press Release No. 329, June 24, 1963. The notification included the following
paragraph:
"The Secretary of State wishes to note that the United States Senate has already given its advice and
consent to ratification of the Agreement. However, under the Constitution of the United States, it will
be necessary to secure domestic legislation in order to enable the United States to carry out certain
of the obligations under the Agreement. In particular, it will be necessary for the United States
Government to receive specific authorization from the Congress to require certificates of origin on all
coffee imported into the United States, and to prohibit or limit imports of coffee from non-member
countries. The necessary legislation has been introduced into both the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives of the United States, and it is anticipated that the authority will be available at or shortly
after the commencement of the coming coffee year. Until the implementing legislation has been
enacted, the United States does not assume any of the obligations for which such legislation is necessary."
This formulation might have raised interesting legal questions for the depositary.
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in a hair's breadth of provisional entry into force. Since with this notification,
twenty-five exporting countries representing 88.7 per cent of coffee exports and eleven
importing countries representing 78.5 per cent of world imports had deposited either
ratifications or notifications, additional action by only one other importing country
representing as little as 1.5 per cent of imports would be sufficient to meet the
requirements. On July i, 1963, Sweden deposited its instrument of ratification,
lifting the required importer percentage over the top and bringing the Agreement
provisionally into force among the thirty-seven countries which had deposited
instruments by that date.62 While ratifications instead of notifications meeting the
requirements of article 64 are still necessary prior to the end of 1963 in order to
bring the Agreement definitively into force, since July i it has been a going concern.
Aside from the important task of bringing the Agreement into force, there were
also a great number of other things which had to be done. Measures were required
to take care of the transition from the old short-term agreement to the new one, to
lay the groundwork for the establishment of the Organization, and to prepare for
the first meeting of the International Coffee Council. A resolution adopted by the
Coffee Conference on August 25, i962 recommended that the members of the short-
term Agreement, in so far as possible, put into effect the quotas of the new Agreement
pending its coming to force, and that they otherwise take charge of matters during
the transitional period. Pursuant to this request, the Consultative Committee of the
short-term agreement was reorganized to ensure that the transition from the old
to the new Agreement should be as smooth as possible and that there should be
no dislocation of markets in the interim. In addition, the Secretariat of the short-
term agreement, in consultation with the United Nations Secretariat, made arrange-
ments for the first meeting of the Council, including the provision of a meeting place
and staff, and preparation of a draft agenda.63
With the convening of the first session of the Council, currently scheduled for
July 29 in London, the work of the Conference will be finally completed, and the
future of the Agreement will rest in the hands of the Organization it has created. In
practice, negotiations have already commenced both within and without the Con-
sultative Committee regarding the many major issues which the first Council meet-
ing will face,64 and the inevitable process of bargaining and compromise which
0 The member countries are listed in the UN Circular Note of July 9, 1963, announcing the
provisional entry into force of the Agreement. The Circular Note also indicates whether the countries
deposited ratifications or notifications. Only fourteen of the twenty-five exporting countries and four of the
twelve importing countries deposited ratifications. The rest deposited notifications. See also UN Press
Release L/109 4 of July 1, 1963. A number of other countries have subsequently deposited instruments
of ratification or notification.
"The success of the Conference also temporarily revived interest in a U.S.-endorsed proposal for a
Seasonal Marketing Fund to provide a regional stabilization system for Mexico and the Central American
producers. The Fund would have operated within the general provisions of the Coffee Agreement, and
would have been financed through a substantial loan from the U.S. Government. See as to background
46 DEP'T STrTT BuLL. 178 (1962).
e4 These issues will concern, inter alia, the determination of the size of the world quota for the next
coffee year and its distribution between members, production and stock controls, new markets, price
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began long before the Conference and will continue throughout the life of the
Agreement is again underway.
VI
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS
There is much to be said both in criticism and in defense of international com-
modity agreements in general,6" and the Coffee Agreement in particular. As a
practical matter, an attempt to negotiate a long-term coffee agreement was probably
a political and economic necessity. Once negotiated, it is important that the Agree-
ment succeed rather than fail. Whether the Coffee Agreement will in fact prove
successful, however, will-as in the case of most international agreements-in the final
analysis depend more upon the determination and attitudes of the Member countries
than on the technical characteristics of the instrument itself.
As grounds for optimism, the Coffee Agreement establishes all of the institutions,
mechanisms, and procedures necessary to provide for the collective solution of
both the problems of short-run market instability and long-run disequilibrium.
In brief, the tools are there if the parties will use them; the Agreement can work if
they have the will to make it work. Moreover, the fact that the countries concerned
could reach common understandings and acceptable compromises in as complex
a negotiation as the Coffee Conference is itself encouraging evidence of their ability,
and hopefully determination, to make the Agreement a success. A continuation of
this spirit in the new Organization would go far to bring about meaningful remedies
to the persistent problems of the international coffee economy.6
provisions, admission of new members, non-members and the use of import controls, the scope of the
waiver clause, and choice of personnel and organization of the Secretariat. A number of interesting
questions of legal interpretation of the Agreement have also arisen in the past year, and some at least
will have to be resolved by the Council at its first session.
" For discussions of the "pros and cons" of commodity agreements, see generally the references cited
in note I supra. For a recent criticism of such agreements, see Swerling, Current Issues in Commodity
Policy, in Essays IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 22-23 (No. 38, PRINCETON UNIV., June 1962), who attacks
commodity agreements for, inter alia, their failure to reach root problems, and their ignoring or
disguising of public costs in terms of the proliferation of controls, overpricing, and bad income dis-
tribution. The study by International Economic Consultants, Inc., cited in note I supra, at 137, con-
cludes on this issue:
"There is no case for or against commodity agreements per se. The question is a pragmatic one: if it
appears that cooperative international action can help to solve a persistent and troublesome commodity
problem, then such action should at least be sought--especially in cases where other lines of attack
on the problem have failed."
Alternative proposals for the solution of instability in primary commodity export markets include
schemes for so-called "compensatory financing" to deal with short-term fluctuations and stabilize export
receipts. Various "compensatory financing" plans are currently under study by the United Nations
Economic and Social Council, the Organization of American States, the International Monetary Fund,
and other international bodies. Arguments have been made for the greater efficiency of direct financial
transfers from developed countries as a means of assisting underdeveloped countries.
" See statement by the Honorable Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, at
the signing of the Coffee Agreement on September 28, 196z, 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 667 (1962). And
see statement by the Honorable Douglas Dillon, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, at the Ministerial Meeting
of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Mexico City, October 23, 1962:
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On the other hand, it is clear that the effective operation of the Agreement will
face a number of real problems.6 First, the negotiations give warning there will
be strong and continuing pressures towards unrealistically high quotas as various
countries push their unrecognized Conference demands in the International Coffee
Council. These pressures may take the form of either requests for waivers or
attempts to inflate the Council's annual estimates of consumption and thus total
annual export quotas. Dissatisfaction with quotas may lead to attempts at quota
evasion or withdrawal from the Agreement.
Second, the Agreement's provisions respecting control of production and stocks
may not be as strong as needed to meet the realities of the world coffee situation, and
may in practice not be effectively implemented by the Member countries. Failure
by the major producing countries to take strong internal measures, including
measures to cut back production and encourage economic diversification, will of
course leave the basic problem of overproduction unresolved. The Agreement could
even have a negative influence in this respect. Thus, by concealing basic market
imbalances, it may tend to create a false sense of security leading to the deferring of
effective remedial action.
A third problem created by the Agreement is its tendency to protect established
producers at the cost of the newer producers who have trees just coming into
production. This will undoubtedly give rise over time to considerable tensions.
Fourth, the Council will have to tread a fairly narrow path in its quota decisions in
terms of the price effects which its controls will bring about. Clearly, the market
must be strengthened if the Agreement is to achieve its objective; but on the other
hand, any significant price increases will undoubtedly bring strong consumer reaction
and put importing Members under heavy pressure from their public to either increase
quotas or leave the Agreement.
Finally, the Agreement contains certain structural rigidities, such as the at least
theoretical lack of power of the Executive Board, the Organization's only continuing
decisional body, and the complexity of the procedure for electing the Board. It will
be difficult for the Organization to operate effectively without some de facto exercise
by the Board of greater powers than the Agreement appears to contemplate.08
More generally, there is much in the Coffee Agreement and the history of its
"[The Coffee Agreement's] great promise lies in the fact that a mechanism now exists through which
declines in coffee prices can be arrested and more remunerative levels of earnings achieved. Success will
be achieved only if the agreement is operated in an effective manner. The United States stands ready to
give serious consideration to any sound project for reducing excess coffee production in the exporting
countries, so as to relieve the pressure for quotas in excess of world demand and to make the agreement
truly effective."8 TThese problems are of a type more fully indicated by TowLa, op. cit. supra note i, at 739-42,
and by Swerling, supra note 65, at 22-23. For an alternative suggested solution to the coffee problem
based on the use of import quotas and a "rational system of international price discrimination, intended
to induce maximum consumption," see Swerling, supra note 65, at 23-24.
" See Hexner, supra note 4, at 376: "There is a strong tendency in international organizations, in so far
as means of implementation are concerned, to interpret their basic instruments very broadly and to
adjust their working arrangements to practical needs without amending their basic instruments."
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negotiation which is encouraging from the standpoint of the development of interna-
tional relations and international law.
Most noteworthy is the increased recognition which the Agreement demonstrates
on the part of the importing developed countries for the problems of the economically
underdeveloped primary-producing countries. In a very real sense, the quid pro quo
for the obligations of the importers in the Coffee Agreement is little more than
the possibility which the Agreement offers of assisting the exporting countries in
attaining economic and political stability. The statesmanship demonstrated by the
importing countries' decision to participate in the Agreement is thus itself a historic
development.
Moreover, the Agreement represents a growing international sophistication in
evolving collective institutional solutions to complex economic problems on a
realistic and practical basis. Thus, the further evolution of the weighted voting
concept in terms of the "veto power restriction" formula represents an interesting
development in techniques of international legal regulation. There are perhaps few
problems of such long-range interest and importance in the field of international law
as the working out of some effective way of reconciling the demands of "sovereignty"
with the practical realities of differences in national power and stakes in particular
international matters. Weighted voting offers interesting possibilities for the attain-
ment of some meaningful concept of international democracy, and the compromises
reached in the Coffee Agreement may add to our experience with the possibilities
for the flexible use of this technique.
Finally, the International Coffee Agreement demonstrates once again the vast
untapped possibilities inherent in international cooperation. Whether the Agreement
ultimately succeeds or fails, the fact that such a solution has been at least attempted
is itself a significant achievement, and furnishes an important precedent for future
collective efforts in the international economic field.
APPENDIX
A SUMMARY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT, z962
The International Coffee Agreement, 1962, as approved by the United Nations
Coffee Conference, is a lengthy, complex, and technical legal document, consisting of
a preamble, seventy-four articles grouped into nineteen chapters, and four annexes.
For descriptive purposes, it may be functionally divided into five parts: (i) intro-
ductory provisions; (2) organizational and administrative provisions; (3) provisions
designed to achieve short-term market stability; (4) provisions designed to achieve
long-run market equilibrium; and (5) final provisions.
i. Introductory Provisions
The introductory provisions explain why the Parties are entering into the Agree-
ment ind what they hope to accomplish, and provide the Agreement's definitional
and conceptual framework. They "set the stage," as it were, for the substantive
provisions to follow.
Preamble. The reasons why the Parties are entering into the Agreement are:
(i) the significance of the coffee problem and need for international cooperation in
this area; (2) the tendency towards persistent disequilibrium, stock accumulation,
and pronounced price fluctuation in the coffee market; and (3) the Parties' belief
that, in the absence of international measures, the situation cannot be corrected by
normal market forces.
Objectives. The objectives of the Agreement are: (I) to achieve a reasonable
balance between supply and demand on a basis which will ensure adequate supplies
of coffee to consumers and markets for coffee to producers at equitable prices, and
which will bring about long-term equilibrium between production and consumption;
(2) to alleviate the serious hardships caused by burdensome coffee surpluses and ex-
cessive price fluctuations; (3) to contribute to the development of productive re-
sources and the promotion and maintenance of employment and income in Member
countries; (4) to assist in increasing the purchasing power of coffee-exporting coun-
tries; (5) to encourage coffee consumption; and (6) in general, in recognition of the
relationship of trade in coffee to the economic stability of markets for industrial
1 To avoid burdening the text or notes, references to individual articles have, with a few exceptions,
been omitted in this summary. However, the arrangement of the chapters of the Agreement is as
follows: Preamble; I-Objectives; II-Definitions; III-Membership; IV-Organization and Administra.
tion; V-Privileges and Immunities; VI-Finance; VII-Regulation of Exports; VIII-Certificates of
Origin and Re-Export; IX-Regulation of Imports; X-Inrease of Consumption; XI-Production Con-
trols; XII-Regulation of Stocks; XIII-Miscellaneous Obligations of Members; XIV-Seasonal Financing;
XV-International Coffee Fund; XVI-Information and Studies; XVII-Waiver; XVIII-Disputes and
Complaints; XIX-Final Provisions. The Annexes are: Annex A-Basic Export Quotas; Annex B-Non.
Quota Countries of Destination; Annex C-Certificate of Origin; Annex D-List of Exports and Imports
in z961.
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products, to further international cooperation in connection with world coffee
problems.
Definitions. Twelve terms are defined. These are "coffee"; "bag"; "coffee year";
"export of coffee"; "Organization"; "Council" and "Board"; "Member"; "Exporting
Member"; "Importing Member"; "Producing Member"; "distributed simple ma-
jority vote!'; "distributed two-thirds majority vote"; and "entry into force."2
Some of these definitions perform an important substantive function in establishing
the scope of application of the Agreement. Thus, "coffee" is defined in great
detail so as to include coffee in virtually every form,' and "export of coffee" is defined
to mean any shipment of coffee which leaves the territory of the country where the
coffee is grown. Any less broad definition would have left gaps in the quota
system. Other definitions, such as "coffee year," "bag," "distributed simple majority
vote," and "Member" definitions, establish the meaning of particular technical terms
peculiar either to the coffee trade or to the Agreement, in order to assist in its admin-
istration and application. Still others, such as "entry into force," defined so as to
include both provisional and definitive entry into force, primarily serve a drafting
function in permitting the use of a short term in subsequent articles in place of a
longer one.
Membership. The concept of "Membership in the Organization," as contrasted
with that of "Party to the Agreement," is a key concept in the Agreement. It is used
to permit the practical application of the provisions of the Agreement to producing
units-either dependent territories or groups of states-which are not identical with
the sovereign states which alone have international treaty-making capacity.
The Agreement provides that as a general rule each Party will, together with
its dependent territories, constitute a single Member of the Organization-i.e., the
Party and Member will be identical. However, two exceptions are permitted. First,
a Party which is a net importer of coffee may establish separate membership for
any of its territories which are net exporters of coffee. Thus, the United Kingdom,
which is a net importer, may designate Kenya, which is a net exporter, as a separate
Member distinct from the United Kingdom. Secondly, two or more Parties which
are net exporters may form a Member group provided that they declare their willing-
ness to accept responsibility for group obligations in an individual as well as a group
capacity and meet certain other conditions relating. primarily to the furnishing of
evidence that they are capable of meeting membership obligations as a group.
'Definitions of the various kinds of export quotas were included in the penultimate version of the text
prepared by the Drafting Group, but were finally omitted as likely to create more problems than they
would solve. It was considered that the Organization could best resolve any definitional problems in-
volving quotas in the context of problems as they arose. As a drafting matter, there is much to be said
for erring on the side of too few rather than too many definitions and permitting the definitions of
complex concepts to be worked out in the light of actual practice and experience.
' "Coffee" is defined to mean "the beans and berries of the coffee tree, whether parchment, green, or
roasted, and includes ground, decaffeinated, liquid, and soluble coffee." These other terms are also
defined in detail.
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Thus, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika may elect to participate jointly in the Organ-
ization as a single Member rather than as three separate Members. In each of these
cases, the dependent territory Member or Member group will be treated, with certain
exceptions,4 as a wholly separate participant in tfie Organization, with its own
representation on the Council, votes, and quota.
2. Organizational and Administrative Provisions-
The International Coffee Organization
In order to administer the Agreement on a continuing basis, some permanent
institution is required. A substantial part of the Agreement is essentially a constitu-
tion or "corporate charter" creating such an institution and establishing the powers
and procedures of its organs and the various commitments of its Members with
respect to such matters as privileges and immunities, and finance.
The International Coffee Organization. The Agreement establishes the Interna-
tional Coffee Organization. The Organization will have its seat in London and
will function through a Council, an Executive Board, and an Executive Director and
Staff.
The International Coffee Council. The supreme authority and governing body
of the Organization is the Council, composed of a representative of each Member.
The Council is headed by a non-voting elected Chairman and holds regular sessions
twice a year. To the Council are entrusted all the major decisions connected with
the working of the Agreement. Thus, it is given sole power to determine the
annual distribution of votes; approve the Organization's budget and assess Member's
contributions; determine and adjust quotas; impose enforcement measures, in-
cluding the suspension of voting rights or expulsion of a Member; determine
production goals and establish a stock policy; waive a Member's obligations; establish
conditions for accession; decide disputes and complaints; extend or terminate the
Agreement; and recommend amendments to the Members. It may also establish
rules and regulations as required to carry out the provisions of the Agreement.
Decisions of the Council (as contrasted with recommendations) are binding upon
the Members.
Voting in the Council. The voting formula in the Council is quite complex,
combining as it does features designed to give importers and exporters equal weight
in determining the decisions of the Organization, and to recognize the different
economic importance and status of different countries, yet put some limit on the
power of the biggest countries to dominate completely the Organization's policies.
The distribution of votes is based upon a system of equal votes for the group of
importers as a whole and the group of exporters as a whole, with the votes within
' The exceptions relate to provisions concerning production and stocks, the election of Council officers,
quorum requirements, and settlement of accounts with withdrawing Members.
5 Article 17. The Council's exclusive jurisdiction over these matters is not stated expressly, but rather
as a limitation on its power to delegate these matters to the Board.
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each of these groups distributed according to the relative trade importance of the
Members in that group. Thus, iooo votes are given to all of the exporting Members
as a group and iooo votes are given to all of the importing Members as a group,
regardless of the number of Members in each group.
At the beginning of each year (or upon a change of membership in the group
or suspension of a Member's voting rights), the Council divides the total of iooo
votes among each group's Members, as follows: Each Member in that group, regard-
less of its trade importance, is given five "basic" votes, but the number of basic votes
given to all of the Members in that group cannot exceed i5o. In practice, this
means that if there are thirty or less Members in that group, each Member will have
five basic votes; if there are between thirty and thirty-seven Members, each Member
will have four basic votes, and so on. The remaining number of votes in each group,
which will be at least 850, are assigned by the Council: (I) to the exporting Members
in proportion to each Member's share in the total basic export quota; and (2) to the
importing Members in proportion to each Member's share in the total volume of
world coffee imports during the preceding three-year period. However, no Member
is permitted to hold more than 400 votes. This provision is, of course, designed to
somewhat limit the dominant voting power of the United States, which would other-
wise be entided to more than 400 votes. 6
Ordinary decisions of the Council require a distributed simple majority vote-i.e., a
majority of the votes cast within the importer's group and a majority of the votes cast
within the exporter's group, counted separately. More important decisions, such
as those concerning quotas, enforcement measures, waiver, and amendment, generally
require a distributed two-thirds majority vote-i.e., a two-thirds majority of the votes
cast within each group. However, special votes are provided for the revision of
quotas in the event of marked price changes in brief periods (a distributed simple
majority vote) or in the event of unsual price changes due to artificial "rigging" of
the market (a simple majority vote). In order to block the possibility of a veto
by either the United States or Brazil in more important decisions requiring a dis-
tributed two-thirds majority vote, a special procedure is established whereby, in
essence, the negative votes of at least two Members are required to block a proposal
to which all other Members within a given group have agreed.
The Executive Board. The Council meets only periodically. The Organization
normally functions through a fourteen-member Executive Board which is con-
tinuously in session and is composed of representatives of seven exporting and seven
importing countries. The Members of the Board are elected each year by the
Council. This election is carried out under a complex procedure of successive ballots,
with the number of votes any single Member may receive in the balloting for election
to the Board limited to 499. This number of votes received by a particular Member
in its election to the Board is quite important, since that Member is permitted to
' Brazil would be entitled to about 380 votes.
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exercise this number of votes it has received in its election in voting in meetings
of the Board.
The Board is permitted to exercise only such powers as are specifically delegated
to it by the Council. However, since the Council is specifically prohibited by the
Agreement from delegating a long list of its most important powers, the Board's
authority is under the terms of the Agreement technically limited to the most routine
functions, though it seems unlikely that this technical limitation will be rigidly applied
in practice.
The Executive Director. The chief administrative officer of the Organization
is the Executive Director, who is appointed by the Council on the recommendation
of the Board. He is assisted by a staff which he may appoint under regulations
issued by the Council. Specific provisions of the Agreement are intended to guard
against any conflict of interest on the part of the Executive Director or staff, and to
assure that they are not subject to special influence from any particular Member.
Finance. During the latter half of each year, the Council approves the budget
for the following year. The expenses of the Organization as covered in the budget
are then met by annual contributions assessed upon each Member in proportion to
its share in the total number of votes in the Council. Contributions are due on the
first day of the year. If a Member fails to pay its full contribution within six months
of that date, its voting rights are automatically suspended.
Disputes and Complaints. The Council is given final power to decide com-
plaints or disputes referred to it by any Member concerned. In certain circum-
stances, however, the Council may, before deciding a dispute, be required first to seek
the opinion of an advisory panel on the matter. If the Council finds a Member
in breach of the Agreement, it may take enforcement measures against that Member,
including the suspension of its voting rights and expulsion from the Agreement.
Privileges and Immunities. The Members agree to grant the Organization such
legal capacity as is necessary to the performance of its functions in their territories.
Moreover, the United Kingdom, as the seat of the Organization, agrees in addition
to grant the Organization and its employees certain tax exemptions.
Waiver. The Council may relieve a Member of an obligation under the Agree-
ment which, on account of exceptional or emergency circumstances, force majeure,
constitutional obligations, or certain obligations under the United Nations Charter,
either (a) constitutes a serious hardship; (b) imposes an inequitable burden on such
Member; or (c) gives other Members an unfair or unreasonable advantage
" Disputes will thus be settled through the Council's weighted voting formula. For an interesting
comment on this subject, see Metzger, supra note 45, at 408-20. And see generally, Hexner, Interpretation
by Public International Organizations of Their Badec Instruments, 53 Am. J. INr'L L. 341 (1959).
8 Article 6o. As is the case with many international economic agreements, such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a number of interesting legal and policy questions will
undoubtedly arise under this waiver provision as various Members seek relief from particular obligations.
The wording of article 6o is itself quite broad and does not appear to expressly except any obligations
from the potential reach of the waiver authority. However, it may be argued that there are implied
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Information and Studies. The Organization is to act as a center for the collection,
exchange, and publication of statistical and technical information relating to coffee,
and may require the Members to furnish such information. It may also promote
and undertake studies related to coffee.
3. Provisions Relating to Short-run Market Stability-
Regulation of Exports and Imports
The Agreement attempts to provide an immediate short-run solution to the
problems of market instability and price decline through the establishment of a com-
prehensive system of administered export quotas. This system is designed to limit
the supply of coffee offered on the international market by exporting Members to
that quantity which the market will absorb at a particular level of prices. The Agree-
ment does not contain any specific price provisions; nor does it directly seek to
regulate coffee prices. However, it is provided that the operations of the quota
system are in general to be directed to "assuring that the general level of coffee prices
does not decline below the general level of such prices in I962. '* In order to make
the quota system effective and to prevent its violation, the Agreement also requires
importing Members to establish certain types of measures relating to coffee imports.
Export Quotas. Three kinds of quotas are provided for by the Agreement: (I)
"basic export quotas," which are essentially a basis for the division of quotas rather
than actual quotas; (2) "annual export quotas"; and (3) "quarterly export quotas."
"Basic export quotas" are established for each exporting Member as specified in
Annex A.' ° These basic quotas are not subject to revision for three years (i.e.,
until September 30, 1965), and unless revised by agreement at a review session which
is then to take place, will remain in effect for the full term of the Agreement."
These basic export quotas do not represent the actual amount of exports permitted
each Member in any given year, but rather determine that Member's proportionate
exceptions such as the automatic penalties imposed for exceeding quotas or the special upper limit to
permitted adjustments in quarterly quotas specified in article 34(4).
'Article 27(2). See also article 27(3), in which the Members agree on the desirability of assuring
to consumers prices which are equitable and which will not hamper a desirable increase in consumption;
and article 42 which permits regional and inter-regional price arrangements among exporting Members
so long as they are consistent with the general objectives of the Agreement and are registered with the
Council.
50 The grand total of basic export quotas is 45,587,183 bags (z bag equals 6o kilograms, or about
132 lbs.). This total is divided among thirty-six exporting countries. Some representative basic export
quotas are (in bags): Brazil-8,ooo,ooo; Colombia-6,oxI,28o; Ivory Coast-2,324,278; Portugal-
2,188,648; Uganda-,887,737; Mexico-I,5o9,ooo; El Salvador-i,429,500; Guatemala-i,34 4 ,5oo; Indo-
nesia-x,17 6 ,ooo; Venezuela-475,ooo; India-36o,ooo; Honduras-285,ooo; Yemen-77,ooo. In recogni-
tion of particular problems of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, the Republic of the Congo (L~opoldville), and
Rwanda and Burundi, footnotes to Annex A provide that these countries can export certain specified
amounts in addition to their assigned basic export quotas.
11 The provision for continuing existing basic export quotas, if agreement on new quotas was not
reached at the 1965 review session, was to avoid the situation which occurred in the case of the present
Sugar Agreement of 1958. Under the terms of that Agreement, the quota provisions expired after three
years, and, since a x961 review session was unable to agree on new quotas, the Agreement, though
technically in effect until 1963, is for most practical purposes inoperative.
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share in the total annual export quotas established by the Council each year, which
is an important fact in itself.
The actual level of exports permitted each exporting Member in a given year
is its "annual export quota," which is determined by the Council as follows. Prior
to the beginning of each year, the Council adopts an estimate of total world imports
of coffee and an estimate of probable exports from non-Member countries for that
year. In the light of these estimates, it then fixes annual export quotas for each ex-
porting Member which are to be the same percentage for all exporting Members
of their basic export quotas as specified in Annex A. Presumably, the Council
will calculate the proportion which its estimate bears to the total basic export quotas
set out in Annex A (about 45.6 million bags) and will then establish the annual
export quota of each exporting Member as that same proportion of its basic export
quota. For the coffee year x962-63, when the Council will not have been in existence
prior to the beginning of that year to establish quotas, annual export quotas for Mem-
bers are established by the Agreement itself at ninety-nine per cent of basic export
quotas.
In order to ensure orderly marketing throughout the coffee year, and to prevent
price-depressing effects due to seasonal fluctuations in supply and demand, the
Council will, after it establishes the annual export quotas, also establish quarterly
export quotas for each exporting Member, which are to be as nearly as possible
twenty-five per cent of its annual quota.
Both annual and quarterly export quotas are subject to adjustment in the light
of market developments during the period. Annual export quotas may be adjusted
by varying the percentage of basic export quotas fixed for Members by the Council
prior to the beginning of the year. This adjustment is always applied uniformly
between countries. Quarterly export quotas are for the most part to be applied
uniformly between countries on a pro rata basis, but in exceptional circumstances
are subject to some individual adjustment within specified limits. As a special
protection to importing Members against over-restrictive quotas resulting in sub-
stantial price increases, if significant price rises or falls occur within brief periods,
Members may request a special meeting of the Council, which may, by a distributed
simple majority vote (in contrast with the distributed two-thirds majority vote
required in connection with most quota decisions), revise the total level of quarterly
export quotas then in effect. Where such sharp price falls appear to be the result of
market-rigging arrangements, the Council may decide on corrective measures by a
simple majority vote (in contrast with the distributed majority vote required for all
other decisions). This means that any producers engaging in market rigging will
less likely be able to block corrective action.
In order to avoid market disturbances resulting from any attempts to unload
stocks prior to the coming into effect of the Agreement, a transitional provision
provides that any exports of coffee by a country after October x, 1962 will, at the
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time the Agreement comes in effect, be charged against its annual export quota. The
Council may, when it comes into existence, make such modifications in the quota-
fixing procedure for the first year as may be necessary to implement this provision.
Sanctions.. Exporting Members undertake not to exceed their annual or
quarterly quotas and agree to adopt such measures as may be required to ensure
full compliance with the quota provisions of the Agreement. The Council may, if
necessary, request such Members to adopt additional measures. Failure by a Member
to comply with its export quotas exposes it to compulsory penalties increasing in
severity with the number of violations. Thus, if a Member exceeds its quarterly
quota once, the Council must deduct the amount of that excess from one or more
of that Member's future quotas. For a second violation, the compulsory deduction
is equal to twice the excess shipments. If the Member exceeds its quota a third
or more times, the Council may expel the Member from the Agreement.
Coverage of the Quota System. The quota system is intended to cover almost
all shipments of coffee by exporting Members. Thus, shipments of coffee in every
form are counted as within the quotas. The Agreement does, however, permit
certain categories of "ex quota" shipments which, so long as the applicable condi-
tions are met, are not counted for quota purposes.
The most important exception relates to exports to thirty-one particular "new
market" areas and countries listed in Annex B. These "new market" countries are
characterized by low per capita coffee consumption and a considerable potential for
market expansion. Exports to such countries are not charged to quotas. However,
the aggregate quantities of coffee shipped to them by all exporting Members are
not to exceed a quantity which will be established by the Council each year as the
estimated amount of imports for internal consumption of such countries. A variety
of reports and checks are required in connection with such shipments to ensure that
there is no trans-shipment from "new markets" to traditional markets. If the Council
discovers any such re-exports to traditional markets, it may charge them to the quota
of the exporting Member originally exporting that coffee to the "new market." If
re-exportation from that "new market" continues to occur, the Council may strike
the "new market" country from the list of permitted "ex quota" destinations.'
Certain other exceptions are also provided by the Agreement. First, any export-
ing Member whose average annual exports of coffee for the preceding three-year
period were less than 25,ooo bags is wholly exempt from the quota provisions.
Second, shipments of coffee from a dependent territory of a Member to its metro-
politan territory are not charged to quotas unless the dependent territory has been
designated as a separate Member of the Organization. Finally, exports of coffee
1 Article 40. The "new market" countries are situated primarily in the Near East, Far East,
Eastern Europe, and Southern Africa. The Communist bloc is heavily represented, with the USSR,
Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Mainland China, North Korea, and North Viet Nam included on the list.
Article 40 is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the Council's estimates and corresponding basis are to
be on an aggregate or a country-by-country basis. Exports in excess of the quantity set by the Council
are apparently not chargeable to quotas.
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for other than human consumption, or for humanitarian purposes, are not counted
for quota purposes.
Certificates of Origin and Re-Export. The quota system is policed through an
international certification system. Every shipment of coffee from a Member to a
Member must include as part of the regular shipping documents either a Certificate
of Origin or, if the shipment is a re-export, a Certificate of Re-Export. Such cer-
tificates must establish the country of origin of the coffee, be in a prescribed form,
and be issued by a qualified agency. The issuing Member must furnish a copy of
each certificate to the Organization. Importing Members agree to prohibit the entry
of coffee from any Member not accompanied by such a certificate, and periodically
to render reports on coffee imports to the Council as a means of checking compli-
ances with quotas.
Restrictions on Imports from Non-Member Countries. One problem which a
quota agreement faces is that non-Members may attempt to take advantage of the
limitation of exports by Members by increasing their own exports. The possibility
of realizing such gains at the Members' expense may even lead some countries
to stay out of the Agreement. In order to guard against this possibility, importing
Members undertake that, if three months after the Agreement enters into force, or
at any time thereafter, Members of the Organization represent less than ninety-five
per cent of world exports in 1961, each Member will limit its imports from non-
Member countries as a group to a quantity not in excess of its average annual imports
from such non-Member countries as a group during the three years prior to the Agree-
ment's entry into force. The Council may, however, either defer the imposition of
such limitations or may, in certain circumstances, require the imposition of such
limitations even though the Members of the Organization represent more than
ninety-five per cent of world exports. The Council may also recommend additional
limitations to be placed upon imports from non-Member countries if it finds such
action necessary. The Council may suspend the voting rights of any importing
Member failing to comply with these obligations.
4. Provisions. Relating to Long-Run Equilibrium-Reduction of Production
and Stocks and Increase in Consumption
The ultimate objective of the Agreement is the achievement of long-run equilibri-
um between production and consumption. This requires, on the one hand, efforts
to reduce existing high levels of production and stocks through such measures as
limitation of plantings and economic diversification. It requires, on the other hand,
efforts to increase consumption, both by increasing consumer desires for coffee and
by reducing various artificial obstacles to consumption, such as tariffs, import quotas,
and internal taxes. While the Agreement addresses itself to both of these problems,
it does so in a more general and less positive way than is the case with respect to
short-term coffee problems. Principles and goals rather than definite procedures are
TH INTRNATIONAL CoFFEE AGmEMENT 387
provided, obligations are less defined and more tenuous, and sanctions are extremely
limited.
Measures to Increase Consumption. In order to promote coffee consumption,
existing advertising and promotion campaigns of the exporting Members may be
continued under the Agreement. For this purpose, the Council may establish
a special committee to be known as the World Coffee Promotion Committee.
However, funds for promotion will be assessed only from exporting Members.
In order to reduce artificial barriers to consumption, Members undertake to in-
vestigate ways and means to reduce progressively, and eventually to eliminate,
obstacles to increased trade and consumption, and to inform the Council of the
results of such investigations within the first eighteen months after the Agreement
enters into force. Moreover, they agree to take account of the results of such
Council review in the adoption of domestic measures and in proposals for unilateral
action, and to review the entire subject further during the third-year review of the
Agreement.' 3
Production and Stocks. The Agreement does not require specific production
and stock controls. However, the Council must, within one year after the Agree-
ment enters into force, recommend both production goals for each Member and the
world as a whole, and a general stock policy, so that supply and demand may be
brought into natural balance during the course of the Agreement. Producing Mem-
bers undertake to adjust their production of coffee to the amount needed for domestic
consumption, exports, and stocks as established by the stock policy recommended
by the Council. It is made clear, however, that each Member concerned is to be
entirely responsible for the national policies and procedures it chooses to achieve
these general objectives. The Members must periodically report to the Council as
to the measures which they are taking in these respects, and the results obtained.
Limited sanctions are provided for failure to take any meaningful action with
respect to the limitation of production. Producing Members failing to adopt pro-
grams to adjust their production to production goals recommended by the Council,
or having ineffective programs, may be deprived by the Council of quota increases
to which they would otherwise be entitled under the operation of the Agreement0 4
In addition, importing Members undertake, consistent with their general policies
regarding assistance, to cooperate on a technical, financial or other basis with the
producing Members in their plans for limiting the production of coffee.
International Coffee Fund. The Council may establish an International Coffee
Fund to further the objective of limiting the production of coffee and to assist in the
'
13 Article 47. A reading of the text of this article reveals the long and difficult negotiations which
went into its deveolpment.
"I Since these provisions apply to "producing Members" rather than to "exporting Members," some
importers, such as the United States (which produces relatively small amounts of coffee in Hawaii and
Puerto Rico), are theoretically covered. However, since importing countries do not have quotas, 'the
sanctions for non-compliance would be inapplicable.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
achievement of the other objectives of the Agreement. However, contributions
to the Fund are to be wholly voluntary.
5. Final Provisions
The so-called "final clauses" set up the legal housekeeping for the Agreement
itself-the conditions for its entry into force and termination; the "ins and outs,"
which provide how individual countries can come into or leave the Agreement; and
the method by which the Agreement may be amended. The "final clauses" also
provide that the "housekeeper" or depositary of the Agreement is to be the Secretary
General of the United Nations. 5
Signature and Ratification. The Agreement is open for signature from the
time of its adoption by the Conference until November 30, 1962. Any Government
invited to the Coffee Conference and the Government of any State represented before
independence as a dependent territory at the Conference is eligible to sign. Signature
alone, however, is not enough to make a country a party to the Agreement, entitled
to share in its rights and obligations. Governments may become actual Parties to the
Agreement only by subsequently depositing instruments of ratification with the
depositary not later than December 31, 1963. The instruments of ratification are to
indicate whether the Government is joining as an importing or an exporting
Member.
Entry Into Force. The Agreement definitively enters into force when Govern-
ments representing at least twenty exporting countries having at least eighty per cent
of world exports of coffee in the year i96, and Governments representing at least
ten importing countries having at least eighty per cent of world imports of coffee in
the year i961, deposit instruments of ratification or acceptance with the depositary.1
For the purpose of assisting the depositary (the UN Secretariat) in knowing when
these percentages have been met, Annex D provides agreed figures as to the amount
and percentage shares of the various countries in world exports and imports in
i961. In effect, the requisite percentages cannot be met and the Agreement cannot
"The depositary of an international agreement has an arduous, thankless, and expensive task.
The printing and circulation of final texts may alone run into thousands of dollars, and the routine of
receiving and forwarding notifications from and to a hundred countries is exacting and difficult. For
this reason, the United States and the United Kingdom, which had assumed this burden with respect
to a great number of treaties and international agreements, were not anxious to act also as depositary for
the Coffee Agreement. In order to distribute this burden more equitably among nations, it was suggested
that the UN Secretariat act as depositary, even though it had not usually acted as depositary for such
economic agreements. The Secretariat graciously accepted this task, though perhaps with some private
reluctance.
" Article 64(x). By way of contrast, the requirements as to deposit of instruments of ratification or
notification for entry into force of other commodity agreements are: Wheat-Governments holding not
less than 2A of the votes of exporting countries and % of the votes of importing countries (Art. 35(5));
Sugar--Governments holding at least 6o% of the votes of importing countries and 70% of the votes of
exporting countries (art. 41(6)); Tin-9 consuming countries holding at least 5o0 votes and 6 pro-
ducing countries holding at least 950 votes (art. XXI(3)). In each of these cases, unlike the Coffee
Agreement, votes are specifically allocated in the applicable agreement.
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come into force until ratified by the United States and Brazil, since these countries
represent such a large share in world imports and exports.
The parliamentary processes required to secure formal ratification of treaties and
international agreements are normally quite involved and time-consuming, and in
the case of some countries, a year or more may elapse before that country is in a
position to deposit an instrument of ratification. Therefore, in order to permit the
Agreement to come into operation more quickly than would otherwise be the case,
a procedure is provided whereby the Agreement may provisionally enter into force
with something less than formal ratification by the requisite numbers and percentages
of countries. Thus, for the purpose of provisional entry into force, a notification by
a signatory Government containing an undertaking to seek ratification or acceptance
in accordance with its constitutional procedures as rapidly as possible, which is
received by the depositary not later than December 30, 1963, is to be regarded as
equal in effect to an instrument of ratification or acceptance. However, it is
understood that any Government which gives such notification will provisionally
apply the Agreement and be provisionally regarded as a Member, and must therefore
be prepared to accept these responsibilities if it uses this procedure.11
Formal ratification by December 31, 1963 is still required, however, for definitive
entry into force, and if on that date the Agreement has not definitively entered
into force, those Governments which have by that date ratified it may consult
together to decide what action the situation requires, and may by mutual agreement
decide that the Agreement shall enter into force among themselves.'
The situation as to entry into force is therefore as follows. Sufficient numbers
of countries to potentially meet the required numbers and percentages for entry
into force have to sign by November 30, 1962, since signature is a condition precedent
to ratification. This has in fact already occurred. Then, if the requirements are
"'For somewhat similar "provisional entry into force" provisions, see articles 35(6) of the Wheat
Agreement and article 41(6)(ii)-(iv) of the Sugar Agreement. The stimulus for the use of such a
provision in the Coffee Agreement came from Brazil which was anxious to get the Agreement into opera-
tion as quickly as possible, had existing legal authority to carry out its obligations prior to ratification, but
contemplated that it might require at least a year to secure formal ratification by its legislature. The
United States, on the other hand, indicated at the Conference that it did not intend to assume obligations
under the Agreement until it had secured further legislative authority, and hence would not utilize the
notification device. In fact, as events developed, it ultimately became necessary for the United States
to resort to the notification procedure. The status of "provisional" Members is quite ambiguous, and is
perhaps better defined in terms of moral obligations than legal ones. These provisions are also complex
and extremely difficult to explain to non-specialists. It would be useful if someone could devise a better
technique for handling this problem.
8 Though usual in commodity agreements, this provision is somewhat confusing, since it appears to
contradict the specific requirements for entry into force otherwise established. Such a provision was
considered necessary, however, to guard against the possibility that ratifications might fall just short
of the specific requirements. In the absence of this provision, the Agreement could not in such case
be put into force except by resubmitting a "new" agreement with slightly lower requirements to the
legislatures of many of the countries concerned. In the United States, for instance, Senate approval
of participation in an agreement requiring ratification by countries representing 8o% of world trade
would not constitute approval of such participation in an agreement ratified by countries representing only
79.-% of world trade, unless a clause permitting entry into force in such case was specifically included
in the instrument submitted to the Senate.
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met before December 3, 1963 by a combination of ratifications and notifications of
intent to seek ratification, the Agreement will provisionally enter into force until
December 30, 1963. This has also occurred (on July i, 1963). By December 3r,
1963, however, the requirements must be met through formal ratifications alone
in order to bring the Agreement definitively into force. This has not yet taken place.
If by that time the Agreement is not definitively in force, it lapses, even if it
was previously provisionally in force, unless the Governments which have ratified
by that date agree to bring it into force among themselves.
The Secretary General of the United Nations is requested to convene the first
session of the Council in London within thirty days after it enters into force.
Accession. Accession is the route which a Government must use to become a
Party to the Agreement if it has not signed the Agreement by November 30, 1962, of
if it is a signatory but has failed to ratify the Agreement by December 31, 1963. The
Government of any State Member of the United Nations or of any of its specialized
agencies and any Government invited to the Coffee Conference is eligible to accede
to the Agreement, but only upon conditions established by the Council. If the
acceding Government is an exporting country listed in Annex A as having a basic
export quota, the Council may vary its quota. 9 If the country is not so listed, the
Council may establish such a quota for it.
Reservations. No reservations may be made to the Agreement. 0
Territorial Application. Any Government may by notification to the depositary
declare that the Agreement extends to any of its dependent territories, or that it ceases
to so extend, or that such a territory is joining the Organization as a separate Member
or part of a separate Member group. If any dependent territory to which the Agree-
ment is so extended later becomes independent, it may automatically become a
separate Party to the Agreement and Member of the Organization by so notifying
the depositary within ninety days of its date of independence.
Withdrawal. The Agreement provides for two quite different types of with-
drawal-voluntary and compulsory. A Party may voluntarily withdraw from the
Agreement effective at any time after December 31, 1963, but may not voluntarily
withdraw before that date. Ninety days' notice is required. Compulsory with-
drawal, on the other hand, is the harshest sanction provided by the Agreement, and
is in effect expulsion. If the Council determines that any Member has failed to
"The possibility that quotas might be decreased was an implied threat to any exporting country
which might contemplate holding off becoming a party to the Agreement through signature and ratifica-
tion, in order to see how things developed, knowing that it could always become a party later through
accession. A country may still postpone joining the Agreement, but only at the risk of receiving a less
favorable quota.
2 The strictness of the reservation artide is balanced by the broad reach of the waiver article. It is
for the depositary initially to decide what constitutes a reservation. This can be difficult since countries
sometimes attempt to attach statements of "intention" or "understanding" to their ratifications, which
may be reservations in substance though not in form. Under the rule of the Genocide Case, [x95i] I.C.J.
Rep. 15, 29-3o, each of the parties must in the last analysis decide whether such a statement amounts
to a reservation, and whether to treat the country in question as a party to the Agreement.
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carry out its obligations under the Agreement and that such failure significantly
impairs the Agreement's operation, it may require that Member to withdraw from
the Agreement. Provision is made for the settlement of accounts with withdrawing
Members in each case.
Duration and Termination. The Agreement is to remain in effect until the
end of the fifth full year after it enters into effect, but the Council may either
extend it or terminate it at an earlier date. 1
Review. The Council is directed to hold a special session during the last six
months of the coffee year ending September 30, 1965, in order to review the Agree-
ment. This will presumably be at the same time when the basic export quotas set
out in Annex A will be open for review and revision.
Amendment. The Council may recommend amendments to the Members.
Since no alternative method is provided, this would appear to be the only way
(other than a new diplomatic conference) in which amendments can be proposed.
Any amendment so recommended will become effective one hundred days after
notification of its acceptance is given to the depositary by Parties representing at least
seventy-five per cent of the exporting Members holding at least eighty-five per cent
of the exporting Members' votes, and at least seventy-five per cent of the importing
Members holding at least eighty per cent of the importing Members' votes. Any
Party which has not accepted the amendment by the time it becomes effective will
be regarded as ceasing to participate in the Agreement as of that date? 2
"
1 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in the Hearings on the Agreement, indicated its view that
the United States Government should not support in the Council the extension of the treaty beyond
five years without first re-submitting it to the Congress for its examination and approval. Hearings,
supra note 8, at 67.
" Amendment provisions can create serious difficulties for a Government seeking ratification of
an agreement from its legislature, and have to be closely watched. The United States Senate, for in-
stance, is reluctant to accept any agreement which may conceivably, as through loose amendment
provisions not dependent on United States consent, bind the United States to obligations which were not
before the Senate at the time of ratification and which the latter has not had a chance to examine.
The Agreement provides two safeguards in this respect: (i) a party may voluntarily withdraw
from the Agreement on ninety days' notice--i.e., before the end of the ioo day period after which an
amendment it disapproves of comes into effect; and (2) even if a disapproving country does not take
this course, it is automatically expelled from the Agreement and thus not bound by that provision.
Suggestions that the Agreement distinguish between "substantive and procedural" or "important and
unimportant" amendments in this respect appeared to the Legal Group to be unworkable.
